Presupposition and negation by Seuren, P.




This paper is an attempt to show that given the available observations on the behaviour of ne-
gation and presuppositions there is no simpler explanation than to assume that natural lan-
guage has two distinct negation operators, the minimal negation which preserves presupposi-
tions and the radical negation which does not. The three-valued logic emerging from this
distinction, and especially its model-theory, are discussed in detail. It is, however, stressed that
the logic itself is only epiphenomenal on the structures and processes involved in the interpreta-
tion of sentences.
Horn (1985) brings new observations to bear, related with metalinguistic uses of negation,
and proposes a "pragmatic" ambiguity in negation to the effect that in descriptive (or
"straight") use negation is the classical bivalent operator, whereas in metalinguistic use it is
non-truthfunctional but only pragmatic. Van der Sandt (to appear) accepts Horn's observa-
tions but proposes a different solution: he proposes an ambiguity in the argument clause of
the negation operator (which, for him, too, is classical and bivalent), according to whether the
negation takes only the strictly asserted proposition or covers also the presuppositions, the
(scalar) implicatures and other implications (in particular of style and register) of the sentence
expressing that proposition. These theories are discussed at some length.
The three-valued analysis is defended on the basis of partly new observations, which do not
seem to fit either Horn's or Van der Sandt's solution. It is then placed in the context of in-
cremental discourse semantics, where both negations are seen to do the job of keeping incre-
ments out of the discourse domain, though each does so in its own specific way. The metalin-
guistic character of the radical negation is accounted for in terms of the incremental apparatus.
The metalinguistic use of negation in denials of implicatures or implications of style and
register is regarded as a particular form of minimal negation, where the negation denies not
the proposition itself but the appropriateness of the use of an expression in it. This appropriate-
ness negation is truth-functional and not pragmatic, but it applies to a particular, independent-
ly motivated, analysis of the argument clause.
The ambiguity of negation in natural language is different from the ordinary type of am-
biguity found in the lexicon. Normally, lexical ambiguities are idiosyncratic, highly contingent,
and unpredictable from language to language. In the case of negation, however, the two mean-
ings are closely related, both truth-conditionally and incrementally. Moreover, the mechanism
of discourse incrementation automatically selects the right meaning. These properties are taken
to provide a sufficient basis for discarding the, otherwise valid, objection that negation is un-
likely to be ambiguous because no known language makes a lexical distinction between the two
readings.
0. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Strawson proposed (1950, 1952, 1954) to regard the negation
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operator in natural language as presupposition-preserving there has been
unclarity, in most of the literature, about the logical consequences of such
a proposal. There was, and is, moreover, great unclarity regarding the rela-
tion between the semantics and the logic of this operator, and pragmatics,
mainly of Gricean stock, has been frequently draughted to help out on
dilemmas in the logical or semantic analyses of presupposition and nega-
tion. It is the purpose of this paper to provide greater clarity in the problems
concerning the logic and the semantics of presupposition and negation in
natural language, and to spell out what solutions are viable, given the empir-
ical facts on the one hand and the constraints of logic on the other.
For a good understanding of what is attempted in this paper, a few
methodological preliminaries will be useful. First, some comment is in order
about the relation between logic and semantics. A distinction is made, here
and elsewhere (e.g. Seuren 1985), between the logic and the semantics of
natural language sentences in the following way. Semantics is understood
as the empirical theory of how humans understand and interpret their utter-
ed sentences the way they do. Semantics is thus part both of linguistics and
of cognitive psychology. Logic is regarded as epiphenomenal upon the psy-
cholinguistic structures and processes at work during the semantic construc-
tion and comprehension of linguistic utterances. In other words, no
separate "logic component" is postulated. Whatever logic adheres to lan-
guage emerges as a result of what goes on during semantic processing. This
is not meant to imply that logic should not be taken seriously. On the con-
trary, logical soundness is one of the important independent constraining
forces on any sound semantic theory. But logical properties do not necessar-
ily count. Only if expressed in logical forms must logical, and hence truth-
conditional, distinctions be somehow reflected in the semantic analyses of
sentences. It is important to realize that to specify the logic of language is
to engage in some form of applied logic.
Another powerful constraining force for semantic theory is truth-
conditional soundness. But again, this does not mean that the adjectives
semantic and truth-conditional should be taken to be co-extensive, as is
standardly done in model-theoretic semantics, which takes the mathemati-
cal model-theory of logical calculi as the prototype of any semantic theory.
There is no need to belittle the merits of the model-theoretic approach,
which has greatly contributed to present-day semantics. Yet ("possible
world") model-theory is hardly a plausible contender for the cognitive and
linguistic problems ahead.
In our view, semantics for natural language covers, besides the straight-
forward truth-conditional aspects, also the speech act properties of sen-
tences as well as everything to do with the processes of discourse incrementa-
tion, including the presuppositions in their different forms. The reason for
this delimitation is that these are the properties of linguistic expressions
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that, together, produce the systematic contribution made by language
towards the comprehension of sentences. (The remainder is contributed by
what we usually call background knowledge.)
This paper thus contains linguistic as well as logical and cognitive
analyses.
1. THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT AND THE LOGICAL PROBLEM
1.1. Russell, Frege, Strawson
The presupposition problem has its origin in two observations, made by
philosophers and logicians of all ages. Both observations cause trouble for
the age-old cherished Aristotelian Principle of the Excluded Third (PET).
Classical (Aristotelian) logic is based on two basic principles, the Principle
of Contradiction, which says that no sentence can be both true and not true,
and PET. The Principle of Contradiction is basic to any form of logic and
cannot be challenged. PET, however, is negotiable. Aristotle himself res-
tricted PET to statements about the past and the present, excepting state-
ments about the future, truth and falsity not being, in his view, well-defined
for the future. (Past and present truths or falsehoods are forever fixed and
beyond the reach of human intervention: the future, however, is not fixed
and thus escapes the strict metaphysical necessity of past and present facts.)
We will, in this paper, negotiate PET quite a bit further than has been
deemed necessary or desirable in the mainstream of logical tradition.
The observations that cause trouble for PET are, in principle:
(a) One can speak intelligibly while assigning a property, by the use of a
predicate, without there being a really existing object for the property
to be assigned to.
(b) Negation in language has the tendency to preserve presuppositions,
although negation as standardly defined in logic cancels all entailments
of its argument proposition, except, of course, logical truths.
Both observations are demonstrated in Russell's (1905) famous (or perhaps
one should say: hackneyed) pair of examples:
(1) a. The present king of France is bald.
b. The present king of France is not bald.
In (la) the property of baldness appears to be predicated, yet there is noth-
ing for it to be predicated of. Sentence (lb) appears to imply that the present
king of France's pate is hairy, and hence that there is something properly
called "the present king of France" in the world to which it applies. Since
(la) implies the same thing, it would appear that this existential implication
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is preserved under negation.
Russell (1905) wished to preserve PET. His answer was, as is well known,
twofold. First, he maintained that the definite description the present king
of France has no status in logic but should be analyzed in terms of the ex-
istential quantifier (plus a uniqueness clause), so that (la) will be analyzed
as follows:
(2) a. 3x (KoF(x) A Bald(x) A Vy (KoF(y) « y = x))
This analysis makes (la) unambiguously false in the present world, since
there is no entity in this world that can be truthfully said to be, at present,
king of France. Russell claimed, furthermore, that negation in language is
like negation in standard logic, a truth-function that converts truth into fal-
sity and vice versa. If (2a) is logically negated, i.e. with the negation opera-
tor prefixed to it ("external negation"), the resulting sentence will be true:
(2) b. -i 3x (KoF(x) A Bald(x) A Vy (KoF(y) « y = x))
It is, however, also possible to insert the negation operator in other positions
in (2a), giving rise to so-called "internal negation". For reasons best known
to themselves, human speakers prefer to read a sentence like (lb) with the
negation stuck in just before the predicate "Bald", as in:
(2) c. 3x (KoF(x) A -i Bald(x) A Vy (KoF(y) « y = x))
This analysis saves PET, and keeps the logic standard, which is what Rus-
sell, and with him the great majority of logicians, wanted. It thus became
the commonly accepted view regarding presuppositions and negation, and
much of the effort spent in even quite recent publications on this subject is
directly due to the wish to keep it so, despite the attacks that have been
levelled against it.
The first big attack came from Strawson (1950, 1952, 1954). Strawson re-
jected both of Russell's answers. In his view definite terms in sentences cor-
respond exactly to (referring) terms in logical analysis, and negation is not
classical but preserves presuppositional entailments. Moreover, a sentence
whose presuppositions are not all true (fulfilled) lacks a truth-value, and
thus plays no part in the logical truth-functions. This was also the dominant
view if not proposed certainly considered in Frege (1892). In Frege's view,
the extension ("Bedeutung" or designation) of a sentence is its truth-value.
He moreover wanted logical analysis to be such that the extension (truth-
value) of a sentence can be computed by functional calculus from the exten-
sions of its constituents. It follows that if a sentence contains a constituent
that lacks an extension and yet is needed for the calculus, no value will
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result. Since definite terms are needed for the intended calculus, they must
have an extension, i.e. a reference value in the world with respect to which
the truth-value is computed. The lack of such an extension must result in
the lack of a truth-value. A sentence thus "presupposes" the real existence
of the reference values of its definite terms, no matter whether it is negated
or not. Both (la) and (lb) thus entail, in virtue of this presupposition, the
real existence of the present king of France.
The Frege-Strawson view is a direct attack on PET, given the possibility
of sentences without a truth-value. It may be useful to mention that PET
can be split up into two separate principles:
Principle of the Excluded Third
a. Full Valuation Principle: Every sentence of the language under ana-
lysis has a truth-value.
b. Bivalence Principle: There are exactly two truth-values: True and
False.
It will be clear that the Frege-Strawson analysis denies the Full Valuation
Principle, but not the Bivalence Principle.
Due, mainly, to a glaring lack of explicitness in both Frege's and
Strawson's texts, considerable confusion arose in the subsequent literature
about the precise consequences for logic if the Frege-Strawson analysis is ac-
cepted. That is, given that a presupposes b, i.e. a » b, and thus, in this
view, a \= b and -> a 1= b and a lacks a truth-value when b is false (or
without a truth-value), and b is not a logical or necessary truth, what conse-
quences will this have for logic as we know it? The most helpful way of
presenting this question was developed by Van Fraassen in a number of pub-
lications, especially (1971). Regrettably, the great value of Van Fraassen's
way of analysing this question has not been recognized by the majority of
those who have, over the past twenty or so years, contributed to the litera-
ture dealing with questions of presupposition and negation.
Van Fraassen works with valuations rather than with "possible worlds".
A valuation is a complete set of truth-value assignments to the sentences of
a language L, in particular the atomic sentences of L (i.e. those sentences
that are formed without any of the truth-functional operators of negation,
conjunction and/or disjunction). A valuation vn thus defines a "world",
or rather a state of affairs, to the extent that L is able to specify it. If there
are two truth-values and no gaps are allowed, and if, moreover, all the
atomic sentences of L are logically independent (there are no entailment re-
lations among them), then , if L has m logically independent atomic sen-
tences, the number of possible valuations is 2m. For example, if L has just
three logically independent atomic sentences, a, b and c (symbolised as L
(a, b, c), the number of possible valuations is 23 = 8 (we use " 1 " for truth
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Fig. 1: Classical valuation space for L(a, b, c).
Obviously, truth-functional compositions follow automatically. Thus,
given that, for example, v3(6) = 2, it follows that v3(-i£) = 1, or, given
that v3(o) = 1 and v3(6) = 2, it follows that v3(o A b) = 2.
It is clearly unrealistic to assume that the atomic sentences of any natural
language are logically independent in the sense that for no atomic sentences
a and b of some natural language, where a ^ b, a 1= b. For example,
English has two atomic sentences John has been murdered and John is dead,
where the former entails the latter, and it seems hardly possible to imagine
a language without such pairs of atomic sentences. Entailment relations,
whether lexical or logical, reduce the number of admissible valuations.
Thus, supposing that in L(a, b, c) a 1= b, v3 and v7 are inadmissible be-
cause no world can exist where a is true and b is false. This entailment rela-
tion thus reduces the number of admissible valuations by two.
Now suppose that a presuppose b (i.e. a » b). In the Frege-Strawson
analysis this means that for any vn, if vn(o) = 1 or 2, vn(6) = 1, and if, for
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Fig. 2.: Valuation space for L(a, b, c), where a » b, in the Frege-Strawson analysis.
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The absence of a truth-value for a in v3 and v6 is an infringement of PET,
in particular the Full Valuation Principle. The common expression is that
we have here a bivalent logic with gaps (Such gaps are an unwelcome com-
plication for any standard Boolean semantics for the logical calculus, as we
shall see in Section 2.1.) Note that the valuations v3, v4, v7 and vg in Fig.
1 are now inadmissible. Instead, Fig. 2 contains the new valuations, with
gaps, v3 and v6. What is important here is that the truth-functional opera-
tors will fail to yield values for any input which contains an unvalued sen-















Fig. 3: Truth-tables for bivalent calculus with gaps.
Clearly, these are simply the classical tables, with the extra provision that
no value results when the input is not fully valued. This extra provision,
however, is nothing new: it follows from the definition of the notion of
function in set-theory. We shall see in Section 2 that the introduction of gaps
in the field of valuations of a language L is something quite different from
the introduction of a third truth-value.
Apart from the fact that the occurrence of gaps causes certain complica-
tions of a general nature in the logic (complications, however, which can be
dealt with), there is nothing logically wrong or even all that remarkable
about a Strawsonian bivalent propositional calculus with gaps. The reason
for rejecting it does not lie in its logical properties but in its empirical short-
comings. Strawson's criticism of Russell was inspired by worries about the
empirical inadequacy of the Russell analysis of definite descriptions. These
worries have proved to be well-founded (see in particular Seuren 1985:
214-7), and, as a result, the Russell analysis is now clearly out of favour.
It is a little ironical to see that the same empirical axe that Strawson wielded
now hit him.
1.2. The entailment analysis
What is at issue is, in part at least, very simple: it isn't true, at least not
generally, that, if a » b, a is without a truth-value when b fails to be true.
We can say in perfect truth, e.g..
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(3) The king of France is NOT bald: there is no king of France.
It is true that normally speaking, let us say as a default, negative sentences
are understood as preserving their presuppositions: they invite the inference
that the presuppositions still hold, but, normally speaking, that inference
can be overruled. This observation was brought to the fore around 1975 by
a variety of authors (e.g. Boer & Lycan 1976; Wilson 1975). These authors
proceeded on the assumption that this presupposition-cancelling use of the
negation operator, albeit marked by special intonation and possibly other
features as well, is general in the sense that all presuppositions can be can-
celled that way. They thus proposed that, from a strictly logical point of
view, presuppositions are just entailments and are, therefore, cancelled un-
der negation. What we identify as presuppositions are, in their view, only
pragmatic phenomena, to do with reasonable expectations in speaker-
hearer interaction. Gricean pragmatics was thus invoked to account for
presuppositional phenomena, in particular the invited inference character
of presupposition under negation and other entailment cancelling opera-
tors. It is fair to say, however, that this pragmatic approach has not been
successful (see in particular Van der Sandt 1982:50-88; 1988:50-86).
What these authors proposed was a reversal to the classical bivalent system
without gaps. If a » b, then classical valuation spaces, as in fig. 1, will
do, with all valuations vn such that vn(o) = 1 and vn(6) = 2 being declared
inadmissible. That is, a » b is treated as though from a logico-semantic
point of view it were simply a 1= b. This analysis is often referred to as the
entailment analysis of presupposition.
This solution would have been satisfactory if pragmatic theory had been
up to the task assigned to it, and if, moreover, there had not been empirical
obstacles. As regards the latter, it has been observed (Seuren 1985: 229-34)
(a) that in certain constructions negation cannot cancel presuppositions but
has to preserve them, and (b) that in other constructions the only negation
possible is the presupposition-cancelling one. This calls for some illus-
tration.
1.3. Linguistic complications
Although no claim of completeness can be made, and further cases will
almost certainly come to light as research proceeds, we can say that in the
following classes of cases negation is per se presupposition-preserving:
A. Morphologically incorporated negations (except when incorporated into
a quantifier, as in nobody, never, neither). Thus, negative prefixes like un-,
in-, dis-, a-, cannot fulfil the cancelling role of not as in (3) above. Thus,
(4a) is strongly felt to be incompatible, whereas (4b) easily allows for the
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cancelling interpretation. The exclamation mark indicates incompatibility
(i.e. contrariness):
(4) a. !Tim is UNrealistic about the risk: he doesn't know there to be
one.
b. VTim is NOT realistic about the risk: he doesn't know there to
be one.
B. Negations in non-canonical positions. By "canonical position" is meant,
for negation in English at least, the position in construction with the finite
verb form. The remarkable thing is that negations in any other position than
the canonical one are necessarily presupposition-preserving, even when they
are logically speaking the highest operator and thus function as sentence ne-
gation:
(5) a. !NOT all doors were locked: there we're no doors,
b. VAll doors were NOT locked: there w£re no doors.
Both sentences are to be understood with the negation as the highest opera-
tor, followed by the universal quantifier. (5a) poses no problem for classical
logic: since the first sentence of (5a) entails the existence of doors, it is in-
compatible with the second sentence. But (5b), which should have the same
analysis, does pose a problem, precisely because it is not a contrary pair. In
our analysis, an account of the logical properties of presuppositions will put
this right.
C. Negations in non-assertive clauses. Typically, negations in non-assertive
subordinate or main clauses cannot cancel presuppositions:
(6) a. !Tim seems NOT to be back: he hasn't been away at all.
b. VTim does NOT seem to be back: he hasn't been away at all.
(7) !Do NOT go back to your wife: you haven't even left her.
D. Negations with certain quantifiers. As was demonstrated in (5b) above,
the negation with the quantifier all can be used to cancel presuppositions.
Not, however, it seems, with, e.g., each (of the), or both (of the):
(8) !Each of the children was NOT given a sweet: there we>e no
children.
(9) !Both of his children are NOT spoiled: he has no children.
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E. Non-extraposed /active subject clauses. Negation over a factive main
verb does not affect the factive presupposition, though it may affect other
presuppositions in the same sentence:
(10) a. !That Tom speaks French does NOT irritate Joanna: he doesn't
speak French.
b. vTt does NOT irritate Joanna that Tom speaks French: he
doesn't.
Note, however, that the existential presupposition that goes with the object
of a factive verb like irritate can easily be cancelled, even with a non-
extraposed factive clause:
(11) VThat Tom speaks French does NOT irritate the king of France:
there is no King of France.
Note, moreover, that when the factive clause is pronominalized by means
of that, the factive presupposition still has to remain under negation, as is
shown in (12a). But when the negation is reinforced with epistemic possibili-
ty and comes out as cannot, the factive presupposition can be cancelled, as
in (12b):
(12) a. !That does NOT irritate Joanna: he doesn't speak French, (cp
(10a)).
b. VThat CANNOT irritate Joanna: he doesn't speak French.
F. Cleft and pseudocleft constructions. As is well-known, these have a
specific existential presupposition associated with the clefted (i.e. the WH-)
constituent: if in the non-cleft version of the sentence this constituent re-
quires a really existing object for the sentence to be true, so does the clefted
constituent, whether in cleft or in pseudo-cleft constructions. This presup-
position is uncancellable by negation:
(13) !What he said was NOT "Damn!": he said nothing at all.
But other presuppositions, not directly associated with the clefted consti-
tuent, are fully cancellable:
(14) vTt is NOT Mr. Hamilton who wrote the letter: Mr. Hamilton
doesn't exist.
G. Contrastive accents. This is an exact parallel to the (pseudo)cleft con-
structions. In sentences with contrastive accent the accented constituent
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serves as a predicate establishing the identity of the entity mentioned in the
non-accented part. This latter entity is presupposed to exist in all cases
where it is in the corresponding sentence without contrastive accent. This
presupposition cannot be cancelled under negation:
(15) !The WAITER didn't start the argument: nobody did.
Again, however, other presuppositions, such as those associated with the
accented part, are freely cancellable:
(16) VThe WAITER did NOT start the argument: there was no waiter.
H. Negations with Negative Polarity Items. As is well-known, every lan-
guage has a, usually large, number of so-called "Negative Polarity Items"
(NPI). These are words, constructions or expressions which, for no known
reason, require a negation or, for some at least, a negative word when used
in simple declarative sentences. (Their behaviour in other clause-types
differs in ways that have as yet never been systematically studied.) Some,
but certainly not all, NPIs allow for emphatic auxiliaries (efo-support when
there is no auxiliary) as a form of negativity. In the examples below the NPIs
are italicised. (17a) gives a standard case. In (17b, c) one has NPIs with nega-
tive words (hardly, difficult). In (17d) one has a case of emphatic do-
support:
(17) a. She couldn't possibly have known that.
b. She could hardly breathe any more.
c. It was difficult for him to go on any longer, (cp. * . . .easy. . . )
d. It DOES matter that her boss is an alcoholic.
The point is that the negation which is required in simple assertive clauses
with NPIs (if there is no other negative word and no auxiliary emphasis) is
per se presupposition-preserving, for all presuppositions in the sentence.
Thus, the sentences of (18) are all strongly felt to be incompatible
(contrary):
(18) a. !It does NOT matter that her boss is an alcoholic: the man isn't.
(factive)
b. !Mr Jones does NOT live in Paris anymore: he doesn't exist, (ex-
istential)
c. !He did NOT at all acknowledge my presence: I wasn't there.
(factive)
Interestingly, NPIs have a counterpart in so-called "Positive Polarity
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Items" (PPI). When a PPI stands directly under negation, the sentence loses
its default property of inviting presuppositional inferences and acquires
what is usually called an "echo effect": it sounds as if the same sentence
but without the negation has been uttered (or strongly suggested) in immedi-
ately preceding discourse, preferably by a different speaker. Take, for ex-
ample, the PPI still, which induces the presupposition that what is said in
the rest of the sentence was true at least till just before the moment of utter-
ance, and the sentence as a whole, if in the present tense, asserts that that
situation continues to obtain. Contrast this with the NPI any more, which
induces the same presupposition but lets the sentence, with the obligatory
negation, assert that that situation has ceased to obtain. Thus, given a sen-
tence with the PPI still, its natural negation will not be that sentence with
the default-cancelling and "echoing" not but rather that sentence with still
replaced by not ... any more, as in the following pair:
(19) a. Harold still lives in Paris.
b. Harold doesn't live in Paris any more.
The test is now that the presuppositions of (19a) are no longer default infer-
ences when simple not is inserted, whereas those of (19b) are not cancellable,
as we saw in (18b):
(20) a. VHarold does NOT still live in Paris: he has never set foot in
France.
b. !Harold doesn't live in Paris any more: he has never set foot in
France.
Examples of English PPIs are (see also Seuren 1985: 233): rather, far from,
hardly, terrific, daunting, ravenous, staunch, as fit as a fiddle, at most, at
least, perhaps, already, certainly, surely, awful, even, each, both, most,
some, several, few, not. (Note that the negation word not itself is a PPI: a
succession of two or more nots has the effect of cancelling all presupposi-
tions and creating an echo. But if there is no stark succession of two nots,
as in (21) below, they can both be presupposition-preserving.)
Thus, generally, when a PPI stands in the immediate scope of not it can-
cels the presuppositions of the sentence, not leaving even a default infer-
ence. It then also produces an echo-effect. Baker has observed (1970) that,
interestingly, this is not so when there is double negation (other than stark
succession of nots):
(21) There is nobody here who hasn't already had his breakfast.
Baker's observations are tantalizing, but still unexplained.
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A further unexplained complication is that some, not all, PPIs allow
themselves to stand under an unaccented not when an explicit or implicit
comparison is made.
(22) a. You are not still building (as we are).
b. She hadn't already finished (as you had).
Such sentences have a (slight) echo-effect, but preserve presuppositions.
However, and this is crucial to us, heavy accent on not is excluded for such
cases.
PPIs are generally excluded in the scope of implicitly negative operators
(or, if one prefers, operators with underlying negation), such as the com-
parative than. This is shown in (23a). In (23b) the some is outside the scope
of than; this sentence is interpretable as "there are some of her colleagues
who she is richer than":
(23) a. *She is richer than you already/still are.
b. VShe is richer than some of her colleagues.
This agrees with the observation, made in A above, that morphologically
incorporated negations are necessarily presupposition-preserving and can-
not (pace Baker) take PPIs in their immediate scope.
It is not known what system or mechanism is responsible for the emer-
gence of polarity items, whether positive or negative, and their behaviour.
Nor is much known about the question what factors lie behind the fact that
often the negation word cancels presuppositions as entailments but leaves
them as default inferences, while in certain classes of cases it preserves some
or all of the presuppositions in the sentence at hand, and in other classes of
cases it eliminates even the default inference of the presuppositions. It
would seem that a theory of topic-comment modulation (as being elaborat-
ed by Van Kuppevelt in Nijmegen) might lay bare the grounds of the neces-
sary preservation of presuppositions in the categories E, F and G above (i.e.
non-extraposed factive clauses, (pseudo)clefts and contrastive accents):
Sentences that fall under these categories have a grammatically fixed topic-
comment structure built into them in such a way that the topic coincides
with the presupposition, and presupposition-cancelling can probably be
shown to be incompatible with topic-hood. Yet on the whole, our theoreti-
cal insights still fall short of an explanation of the facts concerned.
Even so, however, the answer cannot be simply that the negation operator
in language is just the simple bivalent truth-functional operator known
from classical logic, somehow modified by pragmatic factors, as the entail-
ment analysis has it. This type of analysis is in principle unable to cope with
the clear-cut difference in entailment types between the cases where presup-
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positions are necessarily preserved and those where they are necessarily can-
celled. The minimal conclusion to be drawn is that there are at least three
systematically differing ways of using the negation: (1) with the presupposi-
tions necessarily preserved, (2) with the presuppositions reduced to default
inferences, and (3) with even the default inferences removed. The question
is now: what theory has the best chance of coming to grips with the facts
observed above? A Gricean pragmatic theory may be considered for certain
peripheral parts of the job, but it does not seem the first choice for the cen-
tral problems, given the known failure, so far, of such theories in those
areas. The observed facts are anyway too linguistically structural to be a
natural object for pragmatics, whose typical hunting ground is the non-
linguistic interactional aspects of communication.
1.4. Theoretical alternatives
1.4.1. Argument-split theories
As far as can be judged at present, there seem to be, in principle, two viable
alternatives. First, one can try and keep negation classical and bivalent, as
in the entailment analysis, but seek a, preferably non-pragmatic, solution
for the problems raised. Such a solution would have to consist, not in the
assumption of different negation operators, but in the assumption of differ-
ent argument-values for one single negation operator. If this is the classical
bivalent operator without gaps, one solution might be to show that there are
good empirical grounds for assuming that under certain conditions the clas-
sical negation operator takes as argument a proposition of type a, which
leaves the presuppositions as default inferences, while under different con-
ditions it takes as argument a proposition of type /3, which necessarily
preserves presuppositions, and under again different conditions it takes as
argument a proposition of type 7, which has not even the default inferences
left to it. Alternatively, one may assume that the one and only negation
operator of natural language is the presupposition-preserving Strawsonian
negation, which is bivalent but with gaps. In that case it must be shown that
it pays to let this negation operate, under certain conditions, only on propo-
sitions of type j3 (with presuppositions), and under other conditions only on
propositions of type 7 (which have lost their presuppositions). If neither set
of conditions is met, the sentence will be ambiguous between a
presupposition-preserving and a presupposition-cancelling reading, and,
some, perhaps pragmatic, theory will have to explain why the former is the
preferred one and the latter is realized only under marked conditions. Let
us call theories of this type argument-split (or AS) theories.
No such theory has been put on the market yet in anything like a suffi-
ciently elaborated version. Even so, however, it must be said that there are
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as yet no decisive a priori grounds for ruling out theories of this kind. An
obvious thought is to split up a sentence into a logical conjunction of its
presuppositions and its assertion proper. The "argument split" would then
amount to a simple difference in scope for the negation operator. Let a
stand for the sentence a with its presuppositions/?. "Not-a" would then, in
formally unmarked cases at least, be ambiguous between p A -i a on the
one hand, and ->(/» A a) on the other, with, presumably, a preference for
the former. This analysis (let us call it the conjunction analysis) is usually
implicitly invoked when authors speak of "internal", i.e. presupposi-
tion-preserving, versus "external", i.e. presupposition-cancelling, nega-
tion. It has, however, little going for it, mainly because of structural rea-
sons. One problem with this conjunction analysis is that the set of
presuppositions p functions structurally and logically simply as a conjunct
or set of conjuncts. For this to be possible, p has to be "unpacked" from
the carrier sentence a in the sense that p must be fleshed out as a full, syntac-
tically and semantically correct sentence or set of sentences. Since none of
the existing theories of syntax or semantics is remotely capable of carrying
out such a task, this analysis must, for grammatical reasons, be deemed to
be unrealistic. A further problem for the conjunction analysis consists in the
fact that it cannot explain why (24a) is felt to be contradictory whereas (24b)
is not:
(24) a. IThere was a car. The car stopped, and the car did not stop,
b. There was a car, and the car stopped. And there was a car and
the car did not stop.
If, as this theory would seem to require, every occurrence of a definite de-
scription brings along a spelling out of the associated existential presupposi-
tion, the only possible, contradictory reading of (24a) should be impossible,
and the reading associated with (24b) would then be the only possible one.1
In work that is available but not yet published at the time of writing, Van
der Sandt (to appear) proposes an AS-analysis with the classical bivalent ne-
gation operator. In this analysis, all sentences consist of a strictly proposi-
tional part plus an extra bag of additional information which contains the
presuppositions, the (scalar) implicatures, and properties of style and
register (more will be said about this in a moment). The negation operator
standardly applies only to the strict proposition and will thus preserve the
presuppositions as well as the other "extras". But it may also take as argu-
ment the strict proposition under an assumed "echo" operator which is not
phonologically realized other than by special intonational features, and
which ensures that the strict proposition plus its additional information are
bundled together. In those cases the negation operator will extend not only
over the implicatures and other non-truth-conditional inferences but also
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over the presuppositions, with the result that these are cancelled, and are no
longer logical consequences. The echo operator is meant to account for all
cases where a sentence functions as a correction on a previously uttered sen-
tence. That is, the non-negated part of the first sentences of (25) are all con-
sidered to stand under the echo operator:
(25) a. It is NOT sad that she died so young: she is still very much alive.
b. He doesn't hate SOME of his pupils: he hates them ALL.
c. No Johnny, aunt Bessie isn't "SPLITTING" tomorrow, she is
LEAVING.
In (25a), a factive presupposition is denied. In (25b), a scalar implicature
is corrected. (25c) corrects an expression deemed inappropriate for stylistic
or sociolinguistic reasons, (cp. Horn 1985 for an ample discussion). Accord-
ing to this analysis, ordinary classical negation will do, but there is a sys-
tematic ambiguity in the argument proposition depending on whether or not
it stands under the echo operator. At least as far as presuppositions are con-
cerned, this theory is logically equivalent with the conjunction analysis. Yet
structurally it is different, in that the extra information need not be "un-
packed" but is part of the semantics and pragmatics of the utterance that
expresses the strict proposition. Moreover, such an analysis will not have to
cope with problems such as (24) above, since neither (24a) nor (24b) satisfy
the conditions for the use of the echo operator, and the theory would, if
suitably extended, make the right predictions. This variety of AS-theory
will, therefore, have a considerable edge over the conjunction analysis,
though it still needs to be shown how, on account of what structural princi-
ples, utterances carry the semantic "extras". A split in predicate conditions,
as in (30) below, may work for presuppositions, but how would one account
for the implicatures and the style or register implications?
A central aspect of this analysis is the attempt to subsume all cases of ut-
terance correction, i.e. all echo-cases, under one category, semantically
characterized by the echo operator. Underlying this attempt is the claim that
all negations that extend over presuppositions, (scalar) implicatures, or
register choices, as exemplified in (25a-c) above, are utterance appropriate-
ness denials (hence the echo), and form a natural class. It remains to be seen
whether this claim will withstand scrutiny.
One specific difficulty for this theory lies in the fact that the negation that
cancels presuppositions cannot occur in any other position in the sentence
than what has been called the canonical position, i.e. with the finite verb
form (see category B above: negations in non-canonical positions necessari-
ly preserve presuppositions). In this respect the presupposition-cancelling
negation distinguishes itself from negations in, let us say, the Horn cases,
i.e. negations that cancel (scalar) implicatures or correct inappropriate lexi-
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cal, phonological or grammatical choices. Negations in Horn cases do not
have to be in the canonical position, witness, e.g.:
(26) a. Not several but all guests left after the row.
b. Not Lizzy, if you please, but Her Majesty the Queen was wear-
ing a red hat (cp. Horn 1985:133).
In (26a, b) the negation precedes the surface subject, and is hence not in the
canonical position. One notes, moreover, that the quantifier several, which
is, as we have seen, a PPI, does not function as a PPI here, apparently be-
cause the word used is not several but its quoted counterpart "several". If
it had been a PPI here, the negation would have had to occupy the canonical
position, and would have been presupposition-cancelling. This difference is
quite real, and considerably weakens the thesis that all cases of utterance
correction form one "natural" class, which must, therefore, be accounted
for uniformly. Note, for example, the difference between (27a), which is an
acceptable case of presupposition-cancelling, and (27b, c), which are not,
because of their being incompatible:
(27) a. VHe did NOT only lose his arm. He only lost his little finger.
b. !Not only did he lose his arm. He only lost his little finger.
c. !He not only lost his arm. He only lost his little finger.
A theory like Van der Sandt's, with the echo operator, will have to explain
why (27b,c) do not work, while (26a,b) do.
This is not just a grammatical problem (though, if it were, it would be
serious enough), it is also a semantic problem. For, contrary to what this
theory predicts, the negation over the Horn cases does not cancel presuppo-
sitions. Take, for example, (25b,c) above, and try replacing the second sen-
tence, i.e. the correction, by a presupposition denial. The result is unac-
ceptable:
(28) a. !He doesn't hate SOME of his pupils: he doesn't exist.
b. !No Johnny, aunt Bessie isn't "SPLITTING" tomorrow: there
is no aunt Bessie.
It does not seem likely, therefore, that presupposition denials form one
single natural class with the Horn cases, i.e. implicature denials and style
or register corrections. On the contrary, it is quite thinkable that the Horn
cases, as in (25b,c) above, are special instances of constrastive accent (or
clefting), and will thus necessarily preserve presuppositions (cp. F and G
above). They will then require an analysis along something of the following
lines (for (25b) and (25c), respectively):
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(29) a. the proper word * in: "he hates * of his pupils" is not "some"
but "all".
b. the proper word * in: "aunt Bessie is * tomorrow" is not "split-
ting" but "leaving".
The transformational rule of Predicate Lowering (Seuren 1985: 308-11)
would then lower the predicates of (29a,b) onto the position marked by the
asterisk, thus giving (25b) and (25c). Note that (25a) cannot be generated
along these principles. In any case, since little is known, as yet, about the
grammatical aspects of sentences containing quoted forms (the "grammar
of quotes" still has to be written), we will let this particular topic rest, and
proceed to a discussion of possible alternative theories.
1.4.2. NEG-split theories
The other class of possible theories is characterized by the assumption that
it is not the argument of the negation which is somehow ambiguous, but the
negation itself. Although this possibility is mentioned in virtually all publi-
cations on the issue, it is not often pursued in detail. Let us speak of the
class of possible NEG-split theories. The main recent proponents of this
approach, often with an admixture of AS, are Blau (1978), Karttunen &
Peters (1979), Horn (1985) and Seuren (1985). There is also Bochvar (1938),
which is, however, too much lacking, understandably, in linguistic sophisti-
cation to be taken into serious account here. I shall discuss Karttunen &
Peters, Horn and my own proposal now, and Blau in section 2.2.
In the first of these, Karttunen & Peters (1979), the authors propose that
language has two negations, one of which preserves, and one of which can-
cels conventional implicatures. As far as their logic is concerned, however,
the difference lies only in the composition of the argument proposition,
which is sometimes just the proposition, and sometimes the proposition plus
its conventional implicatures. This is like the Russellian conjunction analy-
sis if the presuppositions are replaced with conventional implicatures.
Truth-functionally, therefore, there is only one negation, i.e. the classical
operator, with some form of argument-split. The difference between their
two negations lies in what they are meant to do with the implicatures. And
here the analysis runs into trouble.
Karttunen & Peters associate with each expression^ in the language a
double translation, one being the extension or (e-)expression (X)e, and the
other the implicature (or i-)expression (X)'. The e-expression takes the
semantic value of X as in standard formal semantics. The i-expression
denotes the Gricean conventional implicatures, which, in Karttunen &
Peters' view, include at least most of the presuppositions. They distinguish
two distinct negations, the ordinary negation not, which is presupposition-
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preserving, and the presupposition-cancelling contradictory negation NOT.
If "Ap" stands for "A with the implicature(s) P", (not-Ap)e (the e-
expression) = -> A, whiie the corresponding i-expression (not-Ay = P.
Then, (NOT-Ap)c = -. (A A P), and (NOT-ApY = P V -. P. Thus, as far
as the e-expressions go there is no difference with the conjunction analysis,
except that the implicatures take the place of the presuppositions. So far,
the negation operator is in no way different from the classical bivalent ope-
rator. Only the i-expressions make a difference.
It must be appreciated that this analysis is an attempt at providing a solid
basis for the pragmatic distinction that these authors propose underlies the
different uses of negation. Yet it runs into trouble, as we will now see. The
i-expression, for not-A is, as we have seen, just P (more precisely: (P)e).
That is, Ap carries the set of conventional implicatures P, which remains
outside the scope of ordinary not. Contradictory NOT, on the other hand,
is neutral with respect to P, since the i-expression is the tautological P v - >
P. Moreover, P falls under the scope of NOT. Given that, in this analysis,
(Ap or BQ)' = (P V B) A (A V Q), it follows that (NOT(Ap or BQ))e = ->
((A v B) A (P V B) A (A V Q)). Now let, e.g., A be true and P, B and Q
be false (which is possible because conventional implicatures are not neces-
sarily entailed by their carrier sentences). Then (Ap or BQY is true, given
the truth of (,4)e. But (NOT(Ap or BQ))e is also true, since ((A V B) A (P
V B) f\(A\l Q)) is false, given the falsity of the second conjunct. Under this
analysis, therefore, the basic Aristotelian Principle of Contradiction seems
to be violated, with the result that the logic collapses. No attempts have been
made, to my knowledge, to repair this.
Horn (1985) advocates a position which implies that "negation is indeed
ambiguous, contra Atlas, Kempson, Gazdar, et al. But contra Russell, Kart-
tunen & Peters, and the three-valued logicians, it is not SEMANTICALLY
ambiguous. Rather, we are dealing with a PRAGMATIC ambiguity, a
built-in duality of use." (Horn 1985:132). In this important paper, which
is rich in observations though perhaps a little indulgent on theory. Horn fol-
lows the course, also, as we have seen, taken by Van der Sandt, of subsum-
ing all negated echo-cases under one category, which he calls metalinguistic
negation: "I seek to encompass all these examples under the rubric of
metalinguistic negation: they all involve the same extended use of negation
as a way for speakers to announce their unwillingness to assert something
in a given way, or to accept another's assertion of it in that way. Given the
behavioral resemblances just cited, as well as the prevailing Occamist con-
siderations, there is no obvious reason NOT to collapse the presupposition-
cancelling negation . . . with the negation attaching to conversational im-
plicature . . . . to pronunciation . . . , to morphology or syntax . . . . to
register or speech level . . . . and to perspective or point of view". (Horn
1985:135) This analysis clearly has much in common with Van der Sandt's
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analysis discussed above. The main difference is that Van der Sandt does
not split up the negation operator, making it "pragmatically ambiguous",
as Horn does, but, instead, splits up the argument proposition of the nega-
tion using the echo operator.
The notion of "pragmatic ambiguity" is relatively new in linguistic the-
ory. Horn (1985:135) attributes it to Donnellan (1966). Although there is
some unclarity as to what it stands for, it implies anyway the possible use
of the expression in question in a non-truthconditional way. Horn comes
closest to a definition on p. 136: "What I am claiming for negation, then,
is a use distinction: it can be a descriptive truth-functional operator, taking
a proposition p into a proposition not-p, or a metalinguistic operator which
can be glossed 'I object to u', where u is crucially a linguistic utterance
rather than an abstract proposition." This implies that not is ambiguous be-
tween the classical truth-functional operator on the one hand and a speech
act operator on the other. Leaving aside the question of whether speech act
theory is pragmatics and not semantics, the tenability of Horn's position de-
pends in part on his contention that the metalinguistic uses are not truth-
conditional (and hence not truth-functional).
Here, it would seem, there are problems. If Horn's metalinguistic nega-
tion is defined as "I object to w", where u is any linguistic utterance, then
this operator runs the risk of overgenerating possible uses of not. For exam-
ple, take a situation where two speakers, A and B, discuss the quality of the
treatment of mental patients in a particular hospital. Now speaker A says:
"One flew over the cuckoo's nest", wistfully reminding B of that great
movie and clearly implying a similarity between what is shown in the movie
and what is done in the hospital under discussion. Speaker B, however, vio-
lently disagrees, and certainly wishes to "object to u". If Horn's characteri-
zation of the non-truth conditional metalinguistic negation operator is to be
taken literally, B should be able to say:' 'One did NOT fly over the cuckoo's
nest", thereby objecting to A's utterance. Clearly, however, he cannot. In-
terestingly, most or all languages do have conventionalized ways of object-
ing to utterances in cases like this. In English, for example, B might say:
" The hell/my foot one flew over the cuckoo's nest". But the standard nega-
tion word not cannot be used.
Horn will, therefore, have to delimit the class of cases where his metalin-
guistic negation can be used. It is not clear, however, that this can be done
in a non-arbitrary way, as long as this negation is kept non-truth conditional
and thus purely pragmatic. Horn himself is somewhat vague on this issue.
He rests his case largely on Grice's (1967) thesis that "either truth or asserta-
bility can be affected by negation", and that when assertability is at issue
the use of negation is not truth-functional (1985:137). He then extends this
latter, "pragmatic" use to non-linguistic performances. On p. 136 he pre-
sents the amusing example of a piano lesson: "Piano student plays passage
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in manner y.. Teacher: 'It's not [plays passage in manner (A ~ It's [plays
same passage in manner /* ' ] • " ' Horn then comments: "The teacher's use of
not is clearly not assimilable to anything remotely resembling truth-
functional propositional negation." This, however, is open to doubt. Sure-
ly, the teacher is making an assertion about the proper way of playing the
passage, which, he says, is not /* but /x' (cp. (29) above). In general, to say
that assertability is affected by negation can hardly be taken to amount to
anything other than to say that a certain expression is not assertable, and
there is nothing non-truthconditional or even non-truthfunctional about
that use of the negation.
The picture that emerges is roughly this. As a sentence operator (i.e. with
highest scope), not can be used only when an assertion is truth-functionally
denied, though the denial (negation) may affect an assertion of proper lexi-
cal choice or any other kind of performance. The negation word not cannot
be used in cases that are really pragmatic, i.e. cases where no assertion is
made but an allusion is made or some other non-truth conditional effect is
intended by the making of an utterance (for example, if I quote a line from
Shakespeare only to let it be known how well-read I am). The language may
have other (often not terribly polite) expressions to object to utterances
pragmatically, but not does not seem to be one of them. If this analysis is in
principle correct. Horn's metalinguistic negation is fully truth-functional,
and there is no "pragmatic" ambiguity. If there is any ambiguity, it must
be logico-semantic.
A specific difficulty arises for Horn's position with regard to the word
true. On p. 125 he agrees with the "fleshing out" of (3) above (The king of
France is NOT bald: there is no king of Francel) as "It is not true that the
king of France is bald". Horn notes (p. 146) that this is not always possible
with metalinguistic negation. Thus, he rightly considers It is not true that
the dog SHATon the carpet - he DEFECATED on it, unacceptable. And
he will probably say the same of a sentence like // isn't true that this wine
is GOOD - it's EXCELLENT. (I would argue that this is one more indica-
tion that we do not have a "natural" class here.) In any case, the possibility
of the periphrastic it is not true that in some cases would seem to speak
against the thesis that such uses are non-truthconditional. In order to save
himself from this predicament Horn follows Grice again in saying that true
often does not mean "true" but "assertable". This is, in turn, justified by
examples like It's not true that they had a baby and got married - they got
married and had a baby, where it is said that the difference is not truth-
conditional. But this is begging the question of how adequate standard
propositional calculus is for the expression of events in temporal succession.
It clearly is not. Given "the prevailing Occamist considerations" invoked
by Horn himself (p. 135), there does, therefore, not seem to be sufficient
reason to cut up the word true in the way proposed by Grice and Horn, or
196
indeed to open up a non-truthconditional domain for not. (We shall come
back to this in Section 3, where it will be shown that in an incremental
semantics the truth-conditional difference between p and q and q and p is
naturally expressible.)
The strength of Horn's position depends also on the motivation for clas-
sifying, essentially, the three categories of utterance correction exemplified
in (25a-c) above as one "natural" class. Here, too, there is room for doubt,
given cases like those presented in (26) and (27). Apart from the difficulty
pointed out above in connection with the word true, for this analysis to be
viable it will have to be explained why the presupposition-cancelling nega-
tion has to stand in the canonical position of the sentence, as illustrated by
the examples (5) and (27) above in connection with Van der Sandt's work,
while the other metalinguistic negations, as in (26a,b), also occur in other
positions. Horn's analysis, like Van der Sandt's, has to cope with the non-
uniform behaviour of not in the cases that are meant to form a natural class.
Then, there is the serious problem why English, and with it all known lan-
guages, do not systematically distinguish between the two functions
reserved for it.2 This is a problem that plagues all theories of ambiguous
not.
In my theory, as presented in Seuren (1985), the negation word not is also
considered ambiguous, at least as far as its logical properties are concerned.
More precisely, in my analysis not is LOGICALLY, and hence TRUTH-
CONDITIONALLY, and hence SEMANTICALLY, ambiguous. Yet the
ambiguity is not arbitrary. The two nots share the property of banning their
argument clause from the world picture presented in the running discourse.
As far as the logic is concerned, a distinction is made between a minimal ne-
gation, symbolised as " ~ ", which preserves presuppositions, and a radical
negation, written " = ", which cancels them. Corresponding to the two ne-
gations there are three truth-values: true (written: 1), minimally false (writ-
ten: 2), and radically false (written: 3). A sentence is true just in case all its
truth-conditions are fulfilled. It is minimally false when the presupposition-
al conditions are fulfilled, but not the assertion conditions. It is radically
false when not even the presuppositional conditions are fulfilled.
The presuppositions are all derived from the lexical conditions associated
with the highest predicate of the sentence. These are divided into so-called
preconditions and satisfaction conditions. The preconditions generate the
presuppositions and the satisfaction conditions generate the "ordinary" en-
tailments. Generally, let an n-termed predicate (over entities) Pn have the
extension o(Pn), in any given "world" W. Then o(Pn) is the set of all n-
tuples t of entities in W such that t fulfils, first, the preconditions of P"
and, next, the satisfaction conditions of Pn. Formally expressed, this looks
like the following:
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(30) a(Pn) = (<r,, . . . , rn>: . . . (preconditions) . . . I . . . (satisfaction
conditions) . . . ) (where "TJ" stands for a term referent)
It is claimed in Seuren (1985) that all presuppositions are derived from lexi-
cal preconditions, even those that seem to be associated with, or induced by,
grammatical constructions such as (pseudo)cleft, or phonological features
such as contrastive accent. Clearly, to uphold this view non-trivial gram-
matical analyses are required. This analysis is thus heavily dependent on
sound grammatical theory.
Of more direct interest here is the question of the logical properties of the
two negations, and of the relation between the logic and the semantics of
natural language negation. In Seuren (1985: 239) the following truth-table
is given for the two negations, with the classical bivalent operator thrown
in for good measure, though I would claim that this classical operator does


















Fig. 4: Truth-table for minimal, radical, and classical negation (Seuren 1985: 239).
It is stated, moreover, that any system P of propositional calculus defined
by the truth-functional operators - i , A, V, with -> defined as false when its
argument is true, and true otherwise, A as selecting any value v > 1 over
1, and V as selecting 1 over any value v > 1, is logically equivalent to the
classical bivalent system, no matter how many truth-values P has. In other
words, the number of truth-values is irrelevant for the classical calculus,
although with the three operators as defined any truth-value other than
"true" or "false" is otiose. On the other hand, any n-valued logic allows
for n - 1 different specific negations, whereby the classical negation (i.e. ->)
is equivalent to the disjunction of the other negations. Thus, in the three-
valued system proposed here, -> p = (~ p V = p). See for details and
proofs the Appendix to Seuren (1985) by A. Weijters.
In Seuren (1985), no account is taken of other cases of "marked" nega-
tion, such as those discussed by Horn (1985) and exemplified in (25) and (26)
above. It is Horn's merit to have drawn attention to these cases. Yet, as has
been made clear above, I am not convinced that the Horn cases form one
(natural) category with the cases of presupposition denial. In my view,
presupposition denials form a separate category, distinct from the Horn
cases. These I take to involve a specific form of linguistic quotation in (pseu-
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do)cleft or contrastive accent constructions. They therefore involve the
minimal, not the radical, negation.
Then, In (1985) I provide no clear analysis of the relation between the lo-
gical and semantic properties of negation on the one hand, and its incremen-
tal effect on the other. No clear account is given why negation can be said
to be ambiguous and yet sufficiently unified for there to be one single nega-
tion word. As long as this form of ambiguity is not clearly analysed and
argued for, this analysis is open to Gazdar's criticism also applicable to
Horn's analysis: why, if negation is ambiguous, is there no language in the
world, as far as we know, which disambiguates between the two senses? In
Section 3 more will be said about this. But first we shall have a closer look
at the logical and model-theoretic aspects of the issue.
2. THE MODEL-THEORY OF THREE-VALUED CALCULI
In this section we will investigate the logical and model-theoretic properties
of the trivalent system proposed. This seems useful because surprisingly
little work has been done in this area, perhaps due to a deeply rooted mis-
trust, in logical circles, with regard to such calculi. It is hoped that the
straightforward simplicity of the model-theoretic aspects of three- (and
multivalued calculi will help to take away this distrust or lack of interest.
We will concentrate on the model-theory of the calculi. Note, however, that
what we call "model-theory" must be distinguished clearly from what we
call "semantics for natural language". Most brands of formal semantics for
natural language are based on the assumption that linguistic semantics is a
variety of the kind of model-theoretic semantics developed in logic around
the middle of this century. This assumption is radically dismissed here. We
speak of "model-theory" when referring to "semantic" methods developed
in logic. "Semantics", for us, is the study of the cognitive and linguistic
processes that occur when sentences are understood.
The incremental unity of negation, as opposed to its semantic and logical
ambiguity, will be adumbrated in this section, but not made explicit until
section 3. We will first take a look at the standard model-theory of the classi-
cal bivalent calculus.
2.1. Standard Boolean model-theory for bivalent propositional calculus
Let us revert to fig. 1 above, which gives the classical valuation space for
a language L(a, b, c) with no entailment relations among the atomic sen-
tences a, b, c. In the standard conception, a sentence p is said to "express
a proposition". Let us use the notation " / p / " for the proposition expressed
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by p./p/ is, in the standard conception, a characteristic function from valu-
ations to truth-values or, in other words, the set of valuations in which p
is true: (v jv n (p) = 1 ) .
Thus, in the system presented in fig. 1, / a / is the function (<v,,l>,
<v2,2>, <v3>l>, <v4,2>, <v5,l>, <v6,2>, <v7>l>), or, alternatively, the set
{v,, v3, v5, v7) , and a expresses this function, or this set. In other words,
an interpretable sentence is associated with a set of valuations, or, if it is n
ways ambiguous, with n sets of valuations, in the way sketched in fig. 5 for
the non-ambiguous sentence a:
/ a /
U
Fig. 5: /a/ as a subset of U.
This has the advantage that the truth-functional operators can be interpret-
ed as simple set-theoretic operations on the valuations in the field of valua-
tions U. The classical bivalent negation is now interpreted as follows: for
any sentence p, / -> p / = U-/p/ , or, in other words, the complement of / p /
in U. Thus, / ->a/ = U-/a/ = (v2, v4, v6, v8) . Likewise for conjunction
and disjunction: /pAq/ = /p / f l /q / , and / p v q / = /p /U/q / .
To say that p is true in some vn now means: vn € / p / , and, of course, to
say that p is false in vn means: vn I / p / , which is equivalent to saying that
vn € U-/p/ , or -i p is true in vn. Again, to say that -> p is false in vn is: vn
$. U- /p / , i.e., vn € U-(U-/p/), and therefore vn € / p / . On this basis we can
give a general definition of the notion "truth-value", independently of the
specific properties of the propositional calculus in question, as follows:
(31) In a propositional calculus P for a language L in a universe (set of
valuations) U, there is a truth-value a just in case the propositions
of the sentences of L structure U in such a way that for every p €
L and every vn in U there is precisely one set of valuations H <= U
such that vn(p) = a iff vn € H.
Note that this definition allows for gaps in U only if a provision is in-
troduced for a variable U. Take, for example, Fig. 2, where a is unvalued
in v3 and v6. Here , / a / = (v,, v4). Now the complement of / a / in U, i.e.
U-/a/ , would be (v2, v3, v5, v6), and no gaps would be possible. We can,
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however, make a provision to let U vary with each sentence p 6 L in such
a way that Up is precisely the set of valuations for which p is valued, i.e. the
intersection of all / q / of q € L such that for all vn € U, vn € / q / if vn(p)
= 1 or 2. Then, for a in fig. 2, U a-/a/ = (v2, v5), and definition (31) will
apply, with U relativised with respect to any given p € L.
This gives the truth-table for negation in any U and any L without gaps








Fig. 6: Truth-table for the classical bivalent negation
The truth-tables of the standard binary truth-functional operators A and V
are conveniently constructed as follows. Let /a/ and /b / be represented as
in fig. 7. The standard definition of /a A b/ is /a / D /b / . Hence, any vn €







Fig. 7: Truth-table construction for classical A.
Likewise for disjunction. Given that /a V b/ = /a/ U /b / , we have:
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Fig. 8: Truth-table construction for classical v.
Since a and b are represented in figs. 7 and 8 as being logically independent,
the tables thus constructed can be generalized to any p, q € L.
2.2. Presuppositional Boolean model-theory for trivalent propositional
calculus
We have seen (Section 1.2) that the Frege-Strawson analysis of presupposi-
tional facts is untenable on empirical grounds: it is normally possible for a
sentence to be true under negation even though its presuppositions are not
all fulfilled. We have also seen (Sections 1.3; 1.4), again on empirical
grounds, that a reversal to standard bivalent logic is not a viable alternative.
Our conclusion was that a choice had to be made between argument-split
theories or NEG-split theories (or a combination of both). We will now have
a look at the model-theoretic aspects of NEG-split theories.
Instead of restricting U for each sentence p 6 L to Up and thus creating
gaps, we will now keep U constant again, avoiding gaps, but keep Up and
re-interpret it as the subuniverse of p, still defined as the intersection of all
/q/ such that for all vn € U, vn € /q / if vn(p) = 1 or 2. Up is to be interpret-
ed as the set of valuations ("possible worlds") in U expressed by the con-
junction of all presuppositions of p. Up has no presuppositions in the lin-
guistic sense (as in, e.g., There are trees), we still let p "presuppose" all
logical truths, and say that, in such a case, Up = U. (This, as we shall see
in a moment, makes it impossible for a presuppositionless p to be valued
"3".)
Thus, for any sentence, p, / p / £ Up c u , as is demonstrated in fig. 9
for the sentence a, which we take to presuppose b and not to have any fur-
ther presuppositions.
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Fig. 9: /a/ as a subset of Ua, and Ut as a subset of U.
We have now created two disjoint complements for any /p / , besides the old
classical complement, which is the union of the two others. We shall speak
of:
the inner complement of p: U -/p/;
the outer complement of p: U-U ;
the total complement of/?: U-/p/ (= the classical complement of p).
For L{a, b, c), with a))b, and the valuation space as in fig. 2 above, this
means that/a/ = (v,, v4), Ua-/a/ = (v2, v5),U-Ua = {v3, v6), and, of
course, U-/a/ = (v2, v3, v5, v6), or the union of the inner and the outer
complements of /a/ .
The effect of this is more structure in U, and, notably, the emergence of
three truth-values, which we shall call "true" ("1"), "minimally false"
("2"), and "radically false" ("3"), defined as follows:
(32) For any vrn in U and any p € L: vn(p) = 1 iff € /p /
vn(/>) = 2 iff vn € Up-/p/
vn</>)= 3iffvn€U-Up .
Clearly now, if p has no presuppositions, and thus Up = U, vn(p) = 3
will be impossible because vn e U-U = 0 is impossible. Note also that
there is no room left now for a fourth value corresponding to the total com-
plement, since, given the definitions of the three values in (32), it is not true
that for any vn and any p € L. vn(/>) = 4 iff vn € U-/p/. (In fact, as the
reader may care to ascertain, the assumption of such a fourth value will take
away the truth-functionality of the truth-functional operators, and thus des-
troy the logic.)
This enables us to formulate the logical property of presuppositions:
(33) If a sentencep has the set Pp as its presuppositions (p))P^, then
for all valuations vn € U, vn(/>) = 3 iff there is at least one q € Pp
such that vn(<7) ?f 1.
Equivalently, if p >> q, then for all vn € U, if vn(/>) = 1 or 2 than vn(<7) =
1. It is important to realize, however, that the notion of presupposition
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plays no role in the logic proper once that has been set up. Everything in
the logic will be done in terms of three truth-values and, as we will now see,
the truth-functions, including the two negations. The point is that presup-
positions is itself not a logical but a linguistic-semantic notion. The logic is
only tailored to fit the presuppositional phenomena.
On the basis of this we now define two negation operators, the minimal
negation (~), and the radical negation ( = ) , as follows:
(34) For any/7 € L: / ~ p / = Up-/p/
/ = p/ = U-Up.
It now follows that if for some vn, vn(/?) = 1 and hence vn 6 / p / or,
equivalently, vn € Up-(Up-/p/), vn(~/>) = 2 (and vice versa), since / ~ p /
= Up-/p/, according to (34), and thus, according to (32), vn(~/?) = 2.
Likewise, it follows that if for some vn, vn(/?) = 2, and hence vn € U - /p/ ,
vn(~/j) = 1 (and vice versa), according, again, to (32) and (34). This gives
us part of the truth-table for minimal negation (cp. fig. 4), i.e. from 1 to
2 and vice versa. It does not give us yet the function value 3 from 3. This
we get when we realize that under the definitions given so far U = U
for any p, since U is still the intersection of all /q/ such that for all vn
€ U, vn g /q/ if vn(p) = 1 or 2. With this knowledge we can now say that
if vn(p) = 3, and hence vn € U-Up, or, equivalently, vn € U-U_p, vn(~/?)
= 3 (and vice versa), according to (32). This completes the construction of
the truth-table for minimal negation, as given in fig. 4 above.
In similar fashion we derive the truth-table for radical negation. If, for
some vn and for some/?, vn (p) = 1, and thus vn € / p / or, equivalently, vn
€ U-(U-/p/), then vn € U-(U-Up), since /p / g Up. Now, U = U= p , since
—p can have no presuppositions in the linguistic sense. Therefore, vn (—p)
= 3 is impossible, as we have seen. (Since U is the intersection of all /q /
such that for all vn € U, vn € /q/ if vn(=/?) = 1 or 2, it follows that all vn
€ U must be a member of any q intersecting with U= p , i.e. only logical
truths can intersect to form U= p , and again, U = p = U). This means that
if vn(/>) = 1, vn € U=p-(U-Up). According to (34), U-Up = / = p/ . Hence,
if vn(P) = 1. vn € U=«p -/ = p/ , which, according to (32), amounts to saying
that vn(=/?) = 2. Likewise, if vn(/j) = 2, vn € U -/p/ , and hence vn € U ,
or, equivalently, vn € U-(U-Up), and thus vn € U = p -(U-Up), so that if \n{p)
= 2, vn(=/>) = 2. (It also follows that if vn(=/>) = 2, vn(p) = 1 or 2.) If,
on the other hand, vn(/?) = 3, then, by (31), vn € U-Up, and thus, according
to (34), vn € / = p/, and hence vn(-p) = 1, and vice versa. This establishes
the truth-table for radical negation as given in fig. 4 above.
As regards the binary truth-functional operators, in particular conjunc-
tion and disjunction, it is quite possible to provide Boolean underpinnings
for their truth-tables in a three-valued calculus constrained by minimal and
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radical negation. This can be done in a variety of ways, all of which will
preserve their classical bivalent properties. For conjunction this means that,
anyway, /p A q/ = / p / f l /q / , as in the bivalent logic. The question is now
how to define UpAq in such a way that justice is done to the logical property
of presuppositions as defined in (33) above. One way is to define it as Up O
Uq. The resulting truth-table, which is the table given in Seuren (1985: 239),
is constructed in fig. 10, based on arbitrary, logically independent a and b:
/b/ 1













Fig. 10: Truth-table construction for trivalent A with U .. = U D U..
o possible, however,
table constructed in fig. 11:
It is als , to define UpAq as Up U Uq. This results in the









Fig. II: Truth-table construction for trivalent A with U jAb = U§ U Ub.
For disjunction a similar distinction does not work. We can define UpVq
as U UU , which gives the truth-table presented in Seuren (1985:239), and
constructed in fig. 12. But if Up v q is defined as Up fl Uq, as in fig. 13, no
coherent interpretation results since, given the definitions in (32), a disjunc-





























Fig. 13: Truth-table construction for trivalent V with U>vb = U i fl Ub.
and the other radically false. Fig. 13, therefore, does not represent a possible
analysis.
In Seuren (1985) the table for conjunction corresponds to fig. 10, as has
been said. We now see that this table is preferable to the one constructed
in fig. 11. According to fig. 10, a sentence of the form ac A bd (i.e. a
presupposing c, and b presupposing d) generally presupposes both c and d,
since for any vn e /a A b/, vn € Ua and vn € Ub. In a general way, this is
correct, since a sentence like:
(35) Angus feeds his horse and Paddy feeds his donkey.
presupposes both that Angus has a horse and that Paddy has a donkey. The
table constructed in fig. 11 does the same, but it also makes (35) presuppose
that Angus has a horse or that Paddy has a donkey, which is linguistically
incorrect, as appears from the infelicity of a discourse like (see Section 3
below):
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(36) !Angus has a horse or Paddy has a donkey, and Angus feeds his
horse and Paddy feeds his donkey.
We will see below, anyway, that it is not useful to let conjunctions carry
presuppositions at all. And must be taken to block any projection of presup-
positions, because, if not, a sentence of the form b and ab will both assert
and presuppose b, which is rightly considered repugnant in all of the rele-
vant literature. So it really does not matter much whether we take fig. 10
or fig. 11 as representing the correct table. Both preserve classical logic
equally.
As regards disjunction. Seuren (1985: 239) gives the table represented in
fig. 12. Thus defined, ac V bd >> c V d, but ac V bd does not presuppose
either c or d singly, because for some vn e /a V b/, vn $. Ua or vn I Ub.
Moreover, in fig. 12 a disjunction preserves all presuppositions that are
shared by both disjuncts, or: ac V bc >> c. That this is so easily seen when
one realizes that if a > > c. Ua cannot be larger than /c / but it may be
smaller. Likewise for Ub if b >> c. Clearly, then, for any vn 6 /a V b/, vn
6 Ua U Ub, and hence, vn € /c / . This is intuitively correct, witness the felici-
ty of:
(37) Angus has a horse, and he either feeds it or he starves it.
Fig. 12 thus seems to be the empirically correct.
Blau (1978:75) has trivalent truth-tables for both the presupposition-
preserving and the presupposition-cancelling negation. The former is identi-
cal to our ~ , the latter, however, is the classical negation -i, i.e with truth
converted into falsity, and all other values converted into truth. We have
seen that this negation does not define a truth-value in any logic with more
than two truth-values, since, given the minimal negation and its concomi-
tant inner complement, the classical negation, with its total complement, no
longer satisfies definition (31). Once an inner complement is defined, the
only other negation that defines a truth-value is the one associated with the
outer complement, i.e. the radical negation. In other words, in any system
with more than two truth-values and more than one negation, the classical
negation is dysfunctional as a separate operator.

































Fig. 14: Truth-tables for trivalent conjunction and disjunction as in Blau (1978: 87).
The conjunction operator thus defined is inconsistent with Boolean seman-
tics. This table is generated by UaAb = Ua U Ub (i.e. as in fig. 11), except
that the combination of truth and radical falsity yields radical falsity, which
fits into an analysis as in fig. 10, with UaAb = Ua fl Ub. It should, in the
conception of fig. 11, yield minimal falsity for the combination of truth and
radical falsity, since any valuation which has this combination of values will
be a member of Ua U Ub. Blau's disjunction operator conforms to fig. 13,
which, as we have seen, is incoherent in a model-theoretic (Boolean) in-
terpretation. Blau's truth-tables for conjunction and disjunction must thus
be rejected on grounds of model-theoretic interpretability.
We will see in a moment (Section 3) that the logical presuppositional
properties of the conjunction operator do not matter at all for natural lan-
guage semantics, since, as has already been said, presuppositions do not
project through and, this being nothing but a concatenator of subsequent
discourse increments. The logical properties of presupposition can only be
taken to be epiphenomenal upon an underlying cognitive interpretative
mechanism. The language is free to decide when presuppositions appear,
these being a semantic property. However, before going into questions of
this nature we will have a look at an alternative way of setting up the model-
theory of a propositional language.
2.3. Constructive model-theory for bivalent non-presuppositional
languages
We have seen (Section 2.1) that the standard way of setting up a model-
theory for propositional languages is by associating each sentence of the lan-
guage with the set of valuations, or, in a different terminology, possible
worlds, in which it is true. That set is said to be the "proposition" expressed
by that sentence. There is, however, another way of constructing the model-
theory. Take again the classical valuation space for L(a, b, c) as represented
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Fig. 1: Classical valuation space for L(a, b, c).
Now, instead of letting a sentence express its proposition, which is a set of
valuations, we go the other way around. We drop the notion of proposition
as defined in standard model-theory, and consider a valuation vn to be a
function from sentences of L to truth-values, that is, as the set of sentences
of L for which vn has the value 1. Thus, e.g., v2 = [b, c, -i a, .. .) in fig.
1. It is easily seen that for a language L all of whose sentences are atomic
and logically independent, U = (P(L). Now to say that a sentence/7, whether
atomic or complex, is true in vn, or: vn(p) = 1, is equivalent to saying that
p € vn, and vn(/?) = 2 means: p € L-\n. Valuations consisting of the atomic
sentences of L are automatically expanded by the truth-functional composi-
tions of these sentences.
Now, having defined the truth-values, in the way indicated above, as:
(38) For any vn € U and any p € L, vn(p) = 1 iff p € vn,
and: \n(p) = 2 iff p 6 L-vn,
and defining, in addition, the classical negation operator as follows:
(39) p € vn iff -i p € L-vn, and hence p € L-vn iff -i p € vn,
we can establish the classical truth-table for -> in the following way:
(40) vn(-np) = 1 iff - p € vn iff p € L-vn iff vnQ>) = 2
vn(-./j) = 2 iff -i p € Z.-vn iff p € vn iff \n(p) = 1.
In similar fashion we can, trivially, establish the truth-tables for A and
V, given the following definitions:
(41) For any vn € U and any p, q € L, p A q € vn iff p € vn and q € vn,
and: p V q € vn iff p € vn or q € vn.
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This in itself is not very interesting, and there is no reason to prefer this
treatment to the standard Boolean way of presenting the model-theory of
propositional calculi, as long as one stays within the realm of mathematical
logic. From a non-mathematical, linguistic point of view, however, a
model-theoretic perspective in which valuations are defined as sets of sen-
tences has definite advantages. These begin to show when one realizes that
this perspective enables one to construct a valuation vn by taking the atom-
ic sentences of L one by one and deciding whether or not they are to be mem-
bers of vn. Whenever a sentence p is not in vn, then, obviously, it is in L-\n,
that is, then -i p 6 vn, as we have seen. This property is relevant for the
study of language, since it mirrors what speakers do when they build up a
discourse domain: adding sentences to a discourse domain D can be seen as
building up a valuation. The analog in Boolean model-theory is to construct
the set of worlds that makes up a proposition. That perspective, however,
does not seem to be useful in the understanding of linguistic processes
(though, as long as we know as little as we do, we must remain careful in
making such statements).
We shall call the perspective adopted here, in which valuations are de-
fined as sets of sentences, constructive model-theory. In Section 3 we shall
see how constructive model-theory can be put to use in a more fully fledged
linguistic discourse semantics. First, however, we will have a look at the con-
struction and definition of minimal and radical negation in this perspective.
2.4. Constructive model-theory for trivalent propositional languages
2.4.1. Fully constructed valuations
Still assuming fully constructed valuations (i.e. with values for all sentences
of L), we must again, as in the Boolean case, construct two disjoint comple-
ments, each to be designated by a separate negation operator, in such a way
that the logical property of presuppositions is expressed. To this end we
need to define, for each valuation vn, the presuppositional sublanguage for
vn, or Lvn. Intuitively, Lvn is L minus those sentences of L that cannot be
valued " 1 " or "2" on account of one or more of their presuppositions not
being valued " 1 " . To express this formally, we first define the notion of
presuppositional sublanguage for q, or PL , where q is any sentence of L,
in the following way:
(42) For any q € L, PLq is the set of sentences p € L such that for all
vn € U, if vn(<7) jt i then \n(p) * 1 or 2.
The next step is to define the notion of nonlanguage for vn, or NLvn:
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(43) For any vn € U, NLm is the union of all PLq of q € L such that vn(<7)
/ 1.
This enables us to define the presuppositional sublanguage, or Lvn, for any
vn € U as follows:
(44) For any vn € U, Lvn = L ~NLyn.
Now we can define three truth-values in the following way:
(45) For any vn € U and any p d L, vjp) = 1 iff p € vn
vnQ>) = 2iff />€Lv n-vn
vn(/7) = 3 i f f p € L - L v n .
The minimal and radical negations now allow for the following definitions:
(46) For any/? € L, ~ p € vn iffp 6 Lvn-\n, and - p € Lvn-vn iff
Pt vn
Every vn € U thus has two complements, the inner complement or
Lv n-vn , and the outer complement or L-Lm, - besides, of course, the
total complement, which is the union of the previous two. The inner com-
plement is designated by the minimal negation - (i.e., all p € Lvn- vn are
made true by the prefixing of ~ ) , whereas the outer complement is desig-
nated by the radical negation = (all p € L-Lvn are made true by =), as
is demonstrated in fig. 15:
Fig. 15: Valuation vd with the inner complement L v n -v n and the outer complement
An important aspect of this, which will be further elaborated below, is
the fact that both negation operators have in common the banishment of
their argument sentence from the vn in question. The minimal negation
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"ejects" the argument sentence only into the inner complement of vn,
whereas the radical negation rockets it all the way into the outer comple-
ment, on account of its being incongruous with one or more other sentences
that are members of vn. Looked at from this angle, the two negations share
the discourse-semantic property of banning their argument sentence from
the valuation at hand, the difference being mainly one of intensity. Yet what
is a difference in intensity has direct logical and truth-conditional conse-
quences. The situation is comparable to that of a word like theft. In English
law before 1967, theft was either a simple misdemeanour, to be tried in a
minor court, or a serious felony, involving a heavier form of trial. In either
case, however, the basis for prosecution was the same. In such a system
there are thus two distinct forms of theft, yet they break the same rules of
the penal code. Analogously, language has two forms of negation, but both
involve a removal from the discourse representation. We shall come back
to this later.
We are now, anyway, in a position to construct the truth-tables for
minimal and radical negation. By definitions (45) and (46), \n(~p) = 1 iff
~ />€v n i f f / ?€L v n -v n i f f v n (p ) = 2.Then,vn(~/>) = 2 iff - p € Lvn^ vn
iff p 6 vn iff vn(p) = 1. From this it follows that p 6 Lvn iff - p 6 Lvn.
H e n c e , / ? € L - L v n , iff ~ p € L-Lvn, so that, by (45), \n(p) = 3 iff v n(~
p) = 3. This gives the truth-table for the minimal negation.
For the radical negation we proceed likewise. vn(= p) = 1 iff = p € vn
iff p € L - L v n , iff vn(p) = 3. We are, as we have seen, setting up the logic
in such a way that a sentence under the radical negation operator has no lin-
guistic presuppositions, since what this operator does is precisely cancel the
linguistic presuppositions of its argument sentence. For the logic this means
that any sentence, even one without linguistic presuppositions, still "pre-
supposes" all logical truths, since whenever a presuppositionless sentence
has the value " 1 " or " 2 " , the logical truths will still be valued " 1 " . Given
the definitions (42-44), it follows that, for any vn and for any p, = p €
Lvn. This is so because if a sentence r has no presuppositions, then at any
vn there is no q such that vn(<7) ?s 1 and, for all vm € U, if vm(<7) * 1 then
vm(r) ^ 1 or 2. Hence r cannot be a sentence in any PL of any q € L, and
can thus not be a sentence in any NLvn. Therefore, r must, at any vn, be a
sentence of L-NLvn, and hence of Lvn. This being so, we conclude that
any sentence of the form = p can, at any vn, only be either a sentence of
vn or of Lvn - vn. (46) tells us that = p € vn only when p € L- Lvn. In all
other cases, therefore, = p € L v n - v n , and, consequently, vn(= p) = 2.
This gives the table for the radical negation.
Now for A and V. We keep definition (41), according to which for any
vn € U and any p, q € L, p A q € vn iff p € vn and q € vn, and p V q €
vn iff p g vR or q € vn. We still need to specify, however, under what con-
ditions p A q and pVq belong to either Lvn - vn or L - Lvn, and will thus
be valued " 2 " or " 3 " , respectively. The correct truth-tables are generated,
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as is easily seen, by stipulating thatp r\qk L-Lvn (and hence valued "3")
iff p € Lvn or q 6 L-Lvn, and that p V q € L- Lvn (and is hence valued
"3") iff p € L-Lvn and q 6 L-Lvn. In all cases where p A q ox p V q are
, they are in Lvn - vn, and, consequently, valuedn
neither in vn nor in L -
There is one interesting corollary that follows immediately from this
set-up. It is to do with the presuppositional status of logical truths, or sen-
tences that are always valued " 1 " in any valuation. Logical truths pose
a descriptive problem for any purely logical definition of presupposition.
Such a definition will say that p presupposes q if and only if, for all vn
6 U, if vn(<7) ^ 1 then vn(/>) ?f 1 or 2. As is well-known, definitions of
this kind imply that when q is a necessary or logical truth it is not only
simply entailed but also presupposed by every sentence in the language.
This is an undesirable consequence for reasons of descriptive adequacy:
it is nonsense to say that an arbitrary sentence like My uncle is far too fond
of carrots presupposes any arbitrary logical truth like Nothing is both
alive and not alive. Any sensible theory aiming at analysing and explaining
presuppositional phenomena would founder on such cases. This is our
main reason for not making "presupposition" a relation in the logic and
for speaking only of the "logical property of presuppositions", defined
in (33) above. What we see now is that, under the definition for NLvn as
given in (43), no NLvn can contain any PLt, where t is a logical truth, for
the simple reason that the condition that vn(t) ^ 1 cannot be met. (Note
also that for any logical truth t, PL( = L, according to (42).) This means
that logical truths will never have an influence on the delimitation of any
presuppositional sublanguage Lvn. The constructive approach thus auto-
matically neutralizes this undesirable side-effect of a purely logical defini-
tion of presupposition.
2.4.2. Valuations under construction
The notions developed in subsection 2.4.1. can be used without alteration
for valuations that are not fully constructed, i.e. valuations with values
given for some but not all the sentences of L. For example, let L have any
large number of atomic sentences, and an infinite number of complex sen-
tences, recursively constructed by means of sentential connectives. Let vn
be valued for the sentences a, b, c, d and e, and let the following presuppo-
sition relations hold: d >> h; f >> a; g >> b; j >> a; j >> b. Suppose vn,












/ g h j etc. . . .
Fig. 16: Valuation vn under construction.
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Since d)) h,d € PLh, according to (42), and given the value " 2 " for d, it
follows that vn(/i) = 1. Given that / >> a (and/has no other presupposi-
tions), vn(f) = 1 or 2. However, since \n(b) = 2 and g >> b, vn(g) = 3.
Likewise, vn(/) = 3 on account of one of j's presuppositions, b, being
valued " 2 " .
Given the construction of vn as in fig. 16, and given the presupposition
relations as specified, we conclude that the presuppositional sublanguage of
vn, Lvn, contains/and h, but not g orj. As the construction of vn proceeds
through the valuation of more and more sentences of L, Lvn will get more
and more restricted.
3. DISCOURSE INCREMENTATION
3.1. Some principles of discourse domain construction
The construction of a valuation serves as a model for the construction of
a discourse domain by a speaker. In stringing together successive utterances
of sentences, a speaker may be regarded as building up a picture of a partial
world, which amounts to saying that he is constructing a valuation.
However, since what a speaker does is a cognitive activity, one may expect
this activity to exhibit certain features that do not figure in a strictly logical
modelling of it. This is indeed what we observe. The building up of a dis-
course domain is subject to certain constraints not found in the strictly logi-
cal account of valuation construction as given in the previous section. In this
section we will discuss some of these constraints.
When a speaker is building up a discourse domain D he can be taken to
decide what value to assign to specific (non-negative) sentences. If he de-
cides that a sentence p is to be regarded as being true, then p is increment-
ed in D in certain specific ways. In section 3.2. more will be said about
what incrementation amounts to. Here it suffices to say that, in principle,
when p is incremented in D, the main predicate P of p is assigned to the
discourse entities ("addresses") representing the arguments of P. The in-
crement-value of non-negative p, i(p), is the specific way in which the in-
formation conveyed by p is stored in D. This process is based on the seman-
tic analysis of p, but not fully determined by it: background and default
knowledge play a part as well in determining howp is stored in D. The build-
ing up of a discourse domain is thus more than simply assigning truth-values
to sentences. It also, and centrally, involves a cognitively backed storage
procedure, called incrementation. In this respect discourse construction is
seen to be essentially richer than valuation construction.
If the speaker decides to present p as being true, i(p) is incremented in
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D. But if he decides to present/? as (minimally) false, i(p), though a possible
increment, is not incremented in D but, let us say, "quasi-incremented". By
this is meant that \(j>) is excluded from D and stored in a "counter-domain"
D' . The negation word not triggers this (quasi-)incrementation in D' . D'
is under embargo in the sense that its contents is excluded from D. The coun-
terpart of D' in the constructive model-theory is L v n-v n . Yet it will be
noted that whereas Lvn - vn is a set of sentences, D' is a store of (quasi-)in-
crements.
The notions defined in (42)-(44) carry over identically to the construction
of discourse domains. The notion of PL can stand unaltered. So can the
notions of NL^ and Lm, which can be renamed NLD and LD, respectively.
But what we have called the "inner complement", if applied to some D, is
not a set of sentences but a store of possible but rejected increments, D' .
The first constraint that is relevant here says that only non-negative sen-
tences are valued by the speaker. If he decides to present a sentence p as
false, he does not value not-p as "true". Instead, the sentence which
forms the argument of the (highest) negation operator, i.e. p, is kept out
of D and relegated to the inner or to the outer complement, depending on
the speaker's decision. As has been said, the negation operator is the lin-
guistic element that triggers the argument sentence's exclusion from D.
The increment function i applied to a negative sentence ~ p increments
p in D' . What the radical negation does, we shall see in a moment. Clear-
ly, this constraint does not apply to sentences with a negation operator
somewhere further down in their analysis, only to those sentences that
have negation as the highest operator.
This constraint throws some light on the fact that in natural language
stark successions of the negation word, such as English not, do not occur
other than with an echo-effect, in which case the argument sentence of the
highest negation is quoted and the highest negation is radical. (We saw in
section 1.3. that not is a Positive Polarity Item.)
A second constraint, let us say the sublanguage constraint, says that for
the construction of a discourse domain D only those sentences can be con-
sidered and processed that belong to the presuppositional sublanguage of
D, or LD, to the extent that LD has been defined given the stage of con-
struction of D. This means that sentences that must be radically false
given that one or more of their presuppositions have been excluded from
D can receive no increment value: the function i is undefined for such sen-
tences (though, as we shall see, it is defined for their quoted forms). These
are the sentences that belong to NLD. In the light of this constraint the
notion of presuppositional sublanguage gains extra significance.
There is more, however. The sentences of NLD are not totally forgot-
ten. It is, apparently, possible for a speaker to correct or modify a D post
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hoc. He will do that either because he has second thoughts, or, more like-
ly, because he wishes to correct a D constructed by an interlocutor. A
speaker can thus, in hindsight, include an increment that had been banned,
or exclude an increment that had been included. Our observations and
analyses now suggest that in the latter case, when a speaker decides to
exclude an increment that had already been included in D, he can do one
of two things. Either he relegates the increment in question to D', by pre-
fixing the minimal negation (making it clear through some recognizable
means that he is carrying out what psychologists call a "repair"). Or he
can declare the increment null and void and say that the underlying sen-
tence p belongs to NLD. In the latter case he prefixes the radical negation,
thereby relegating the sentence p, not the corresponding increment i(p),
to the outer complement of D, i.e. to NLD. When a speaker does that he
had better also identify the specific presupposition or presuppositions of
p whose increment has to be removed from D along with i(p) itself, there-
by causing p to belong to NLD. For this to be possible we must assume that
it is possible to speak about linguistic elements such as sentences. In other
words, we must assume that quoted linguistic elements can figure in sen-
tences, and that the incrementation procedure for such sentences involves
the setting up of separate addresses to cater for expressions and not their
discourse denotata. This assumption, however, is perfectly reasonable, both
from a naive observational point of view and from the point of view of lin-
guistic theory.
The sublanguage constraint, together with the possibility of post hoc cor-
rection, is thus responsible for the echo-effect observed in radically negated
sentences. A sentence of the form not-p can only be minimally negated, with
the incremental effect that i(p) is added to D' . But the negation in a sentence
of the form not-"p" is metalinguistic and is used when (the increment of)
some presupposition of p is removed from D so that, from then on, p €
NLD. Now an address is set up for the sentence p, representing the real
world object p. Under this address a predication is stored to the effect that
the sentence called "p" falls outside LD.3 In the following section 3.2., we
shall be more explicit on this aspect.
This analysis smacks a little of both Van der Sandt's Argument-Split solu-
tion, with the echo-operator, and Horn's NEG-split theory with metalin-
guistic negation. And indeed, it combines elements of both theories, exclud-
ing, however, the element that they have in common. Both Horn and Van
der Sandt take presuppositions, (scalar) implicatures and implications of
style and register appropriateness together and let the metalinguistic nega-
tion (which, in Van der Sandt's analysis is the classical negation over the
quote operator) extend over these as well as over the sentence proper. In our
view this is too gross a measure, since, as we saw in section 1.4.1., de-
nials of implicatures or style or register appropriateness implications are
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presupposition-preserving, whereas presupposition denials leave the im-
plicatures and the style or register implications intact. We therefore set the
presupposition denials off, as a separate category, from the other denials.
On the other hand we accept the distinction between "straight" negation
and metalinguistic negation, and it would seem that, for the latter, the as-
sumption of a quote operator of some kind would be indispensable.
The metalinguistic negation that affects (scalar) implicatures and/or im-
plications of appropriate selections of style and register operates on sen-
tences with a semantic analysis involving clefting, as illustrated in (29)
above. The quoted linguistic element is the predicate of the cleft construc-
tion, and the assertion is about proper linguistic selection, as in (47):
(47) a. She doesn't LIKE him. She LOVES him.
b. - [the proper expression * in "she * him" is "likes"]. The
proper expression • in "she * him" is "loves".
This presupposes that there is a proper expression to fill the gap in "she *
him", and since "proper" implies "true", all presuppositional entailments
of "she loves him" are preserved. It is difficult for this use of metalinguistic
minimal negation to put quotes around a complete sentence. The only pos-
sible choice is for surface constituents to be quoted and placed in predicate
position. Sentences of the form not-"p" have no choice but to instantiate
radical negation. This fact is no doubt in part responsible for the fact, ob-
served in Section 1.3., under B, that the radical negation can occur only in
the canonical position of its sentence. The radical negation is sentence nega-
tion, but not in the ordinary way, whereby, in terms of Boolean model-
theory, the semantic value of the argument sentence is converted into its
complement, but in a special reserved sense in which the argument sentence
is taken as its own name, and the negation assigns it the property of belong-
ing to NLD.
This implies a two-dimensional matrix for the possible uses of negation,
as in fig. 17:







l - i ]
+
Fig. 17: The different uses of negation.
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The feature [ + / - i] indicates whether incrementation under negation
results in a "straight" (quasi-)increment or in a quoted sentence being treat-
ed as a discourse object. The presupposition-denying radical negation must
result in the quoted sentence treatment due to the sublanguage constraint
for discourse domains. The presupposition-preserving minimal negation,
however, results in "straight" increments, relegating them to D' . More-
over, "straight", non-metalinguistic negation also results in "straight"
increments, and not in the quoted sentence treatment, because if it did it
would be metalinguistic by definition. As a result the box for "straight"
radical negation must remain empty, since the sublanguage constraint does
not allow incremental results for sentences of NLD, other than by predicat-
ing this property of "p".
Approaches like those of Horn or Van der Sandt have the great methodo-
logical merit of applying Occam's razor to the process of theory building.
This razor cuts growth wherever that is practicable in the light of the avail-
able factual data. It must, however, refrain from cutting when the data
stand in the way. (It's all right to cut the stubble, but the face must be
spared.) My contention is that, as so often, especially in the human sciences,
careful observation of the material forces us to enrich the theory, leaving
less scope for Occam's razor to do its cutting.
There are, of course, other constraints for the construction of discourse
domains. A prominent one among them is the presupposition first con-
straint, which dictates that for any sentence q which is also an incrementation
unit, and for any sentence^ € PL , \{q) must precede i(p) in the construction
of any D. This means that a partially constructed valuation like the one
presented in fig. 16 cannot correspond to a real D under construction, be-
cause (/has already been valued ("2"), but its presupposition h is still up for
valuation. In any real D, i(h) would have been slipped in before i(d).
The presupposition first constraint applies to incrementation units, which
do not necessarily coincide with sentences. Conjunctions, in particular,
seem not to function as single incrementation units, though we must con-
sider them, of course, to form single but complex sentences. The central pre-
suppositional problem with conjunctions is that sentences of the formpand
a (i.e. p conjoined with a presupposing p, as in "He is a crook, and you
know it") both assert and presuppose p if we treat them as single incremen-
tation units. This is counterintuitive and counterproductive, since it requires
that we have \(p) first, to be followed by \{p and q), which results anyway
in \(p) followed by \{q). The result would be a pointless repetition of \{p).
For that reason we stipulate that the conjuncts of a conjunction form
separate incrementation units. Now p and a results simply in \(p) followed
by \(q). (For more discussion see Seuren 1985: 280-284.)
It is, however, not our business here to develop a complete theory of D-
construction, and we shall now pass on to the question of the actual in-
crementation result of negative sentences.
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3.2. The incrementation of negation
If a discourse domain is D to be an adequate storage for the information
conveyed by successive sentences in a discourse, it must possess a fairly com-
plex array of storage methods. Even if we assume, as we do, that the infor-
mation stored in a D is purely structural and thus excludes lexical semantic
analyses or encyclopaedic knowledge about the things talked about, it still
requires quite complex management procedures, which it cannot be our pur-
pose here to specify in full. What is required in any case is a set of addresses
accumulating the information provided of the individuals that figure in the
discourse. There will be singular and plural addresses, and other kinds as
well. (Thus, for example, addresses must be made available for the facts that
are being talked about.) Moreover, D must provide the means for contain-
ing instructions relating to the further development of D. These instructions
are expressed linguistically through "technical" operators such as not, and,
or, or if, the quantifiers, or any predicate, such as believe, that introduces
an intensional subdomain.
What interests us here is the way not determines the incrementation result
of its argument. To illustrate this, let us take the case of a simple sentence
like (48a), with its minimal negative counterpart (48b):
(48) a. The car hit the curb.
b. The car did not hit the curb.
For these sentences to be processes in some D, D must contain addresses for
the terms the car and the curb, with at least the following information:
a,: car(a) a-,: curb(a)
(The horizontal line underneath the predications "car(a)" and "curb(a)"
indicates "address closure", an operation required for referential correct-
ness (see Seuren 1985: 317-319). We will not expand on this aspect of the
theory here. Yet the closure operation will be mentioned wherever appro-
priate.) The incrementation of (48a) now results in the addition of the predi-
cation "hit (ap a2)" to both addresses (whereby the non-subscripted "a"
stands for the address in question):
a,: car(a) a-,: curb(a)
hit(a, a2) hit(a,, a)
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(No account is taken of tense or aspect phenomena. Speech act properties
are also disregarded, as well as other possible factors that should be taken
into account in a fully developed incrementation procedure.)
The minimally negative (48b) is incremented in much the same way as
(48a), but with the extra condition that the increment is to be stored not in
D but in the counter-domain D'. This must be indicated formally, for exam-





D now contains the instruction that the predication "hit(a,, a2)" is ostra-
cised as an increment for the duration of D.
An analogous procedure is followed when the setting up of a new address
is banned and relegated to D' . A new address is set up in one of two ways.
The canonical way is through the occurrence of an existential quantifier at
the top of the semantic analysis of the sentence to be incremented, as in (49a)
with the semantic analysis (49b):
(49) a. A car drove past.
b. 31 T x(drive past(x))," x(car(x))]
In (49b) the existential quantifier "31" functions as a technical higher order
binary predicate over pairs of sets, the first set consisting of the individuals
that' 'drive past", the second set being the set of cars. The satisfaction con-
dition associated with this predicate is, simply, that the two sets have an in-
tersection of at least one individual. The existential predicate is "technical"
because its increment value is non-standard. The resulting increment con-
sists, in fact, in the setting up of a new singular address:
a 3 : car(a)
drive past(a)
(A new address set up in this way is not closed by the horizontal line: it will
be as soon as a subsequent definite term denotes it. "Open" addresses are
satisfied by anything in the model (world) that answers the description
stored in the address. Open addresses thus have a truth-value: they can be
true or false (or truthvalueless if no verification domain is specified). Closed
addresses are cognitively fixed onto a specific individual or set of individ-
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uals.) The (minimal) negation of (49a) is (50a), with the analysis (50b):
(50) a. No car drove past
b. ~ 31 r x(drive past(x))," x(car(x))]
The resulting increment is like that of (49b), except for the asterisk which
indicates that this increment, though otherwise in order, is relegated by the
speaker to D' :
car(a)
drive past(a)
The second way of setting up a new address is by means of so-called "post
hoc suppletion" (also called "backward suppletion" or "accommoda-
tion"). This takes place when the text contains no explicit existential state-
ment, but only a definite description without, as yet, a corresponding do-
main address. When available background knowledge supports the setting
up, post hoc, of a proper address for the definite term to "land at", that
is what happens. Thus, when I begin a story uttering (48a), without first
properly introducing the car I am speaking about (for example by saying
something like As I was taking my morning stroll, a car drove past), post
hoc suppletion quickly slips in a car-address, as though I had actually ut-
tered an existential statement. Addresses set up as a result of post hoc sup-
pletion are immediately closed, simply because they are immediately denot-
ed by a definite term.
This apparatus suffices, in principle, for the minimal negation. It caters
for the Horn cases if provisions are made for the accommodation of quoted
elements. Suppose someone says (51a) and I say, correcting the previous
speaker, (51b) with the semantic analysis (51c):
(51) a. She took some of it.
b. No, she didn't take SOME of it. She took ALL of it.
c. ~ [be "some" (the proper expression * in "She took * of it)];
be "all" (the proper expression * in "She took * of it")
When (51b) is up for incrementation, a new address is slipped in, by back-
ward suppletion, for the definite term the proper expression * in "She took
* of it", and this address is immediately closed. Then the predication (be)
"some" is added with an asterisk and the predication (be) "all" is added
without asterisk:




There is thus no question of a sentence like (51 b) being in any way an incom-
patible conjunction of contrary conjuncts (assuming, reasonably, that the
it stands for something real, otherwise the conclusion, in standard predicate
calculus, is that she took nothing). The sentence is not, or anyway not
directly, about what, if anything, she took, but about what expression
describes the situation most adequately. That the semantic analysis takes an
unusual form, as in (51c), seems best attributed to the, still largely
unknown, peculiarities of the grammar of quotes, and not to an alleged am-
biguity of the word not, whether this ambiguity is called pragmatic (as Horn
does) or semantic, or logical, or what not.
Now suppose (48b) is to be incremented not with the minimal but with
the radical negation:
(52) The car did NOT hit the curb. There was no curb!
For such a pair of sentences to be incremented it is required that D already
contains the increment of (48a). The car hit the curb. By way of "repair"
the speaker wishes to undo both that increment and the increment consisting
in the setting up of address a2, the curb-address. This means that a2 is
asterisked. But now i (the car hit the curb) is undefined, since one of the
presuppositions of that sentence has been banned from D and relegated to
D'. Therefore, the normal method of keeping increments away from D, by
relegating them to D', cannot be followed. The solution adopted by the hu-
man linguistic faculty is, apparently, to quote the sentence in question, in-
stead of taking the increment, and assigning to that sentence the property
of belonging to NLD. The sentence thus remains without its standard incre-
ment value, but it is incremented as an address in D, denoted by its quoted
form (its name). The result looks something like the following:4
a36- "the car hit the curb" (a)
NLD (a)
This analysis clearly implies a truth-conditional difference between
minimal and radical not, and hence a semantic ambiguity. A minimally
negative sentence not-p is true just in case the preconditions of the highest
predicate P of p are fulfilled, but not the satisfaction conditions of p. The
radically negative not-"p" is true just in case the sentence/? does not belong
to the presuppositional sublanguage of the D in question, i.e. there is pre-
supposition failure resulting from non-fulfilment of the preconditions of P.
As we have seen, this truth-conditional difference is neatly expressed in
terms of a three-valued logic. Such a logic, however, is nothing but a state-
ment of the logical properties of the system at hand. It is not by itself a
description of the system.
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This ambiguity, however, is quite unlike any arbitrary lexical ambiguity
that may occur in a language, such as the ambiguity of the English noun
plant, which is ambiguous between a botanical object and a complex of
buildings and constructions intended for industrial production. As ambigui-
ties go, the ambiguity of not is highly idiosyncratic, in that it is not haphaz-
ard but manifests different methods of banning increments from D. We
may say that the increment function i contains a negation algorithm, rough-
ly and incompletely characterized as follows:
(53) For any sentence with not as the highest operator, not takes the
"straight" increment \{p) of its argument p or "p". If the argument
is/?, not assigns \{p) to D'. If the argument is "p", not assigns the
predication "/vXD(a)" to the address an set up (post hoc) as the
denotation of the name "p". In that case, there must be some i(q)
in D, such that p > > q, and not-q must be processed.
As has been said above, it is like theft being either a felony or a mis-
demeanour: in either case there is illegal taking possession of goods. Here
we have minimal and radical negation. In either case there is failure of predi-
cate conditions, and in either case there is banning of an increment from D.
Moreover, the increment function i is organized in such a way that, given
some appropriate D, the question of whether not takes p or "p" as argu-
ment is automatically settled. If p belongs to LD, then not takes unquoted
p as its argument, resulting in \(p) becoming part of D' . But if the speaker
decides to revise D so as to make p belong to NLD, not has no choice but
to take "p" as its argument, with the quotes. Thus used, not assumes differ-
ent truth-conditions.
It is not possible to say that this explains why natural languages tend not
to have separate words for minimal and radical negation, since, clearly, we
have as yet no general theory that will predict for special cases such as nega-
tion whether or not overt disambiguation will take place. All we can do at
this stage is say, in hindsight, that, given the close relationship between the
two meanings of not, given the automatic selection, in any D, of the proper
reading, and given the strongly marked character of radical not, there is, ap-
parently, no need for disambiguation.5 Gazdar's objection (quoted in note
2 above), that negation is unlikely to be ambiguous because languages tend
not to disambiguate it, is reasonable and must be answered. The answer we
can give now is that, given the analyses presented above, one is justified in
saying that this objection need not cause too much concern. We now know
that negation is sufficiently different from ordinary cases of lexical am-
biguity for this objection to lose most if not all of its force. Later research
will hopefully show whether negation is unique in this respect, or whether
it does, after all, fit into a more general pattern.
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3.3. The empirical value of logical analysis
We can now be more specific about the relation between the logic that goes
with the incremental system and the system itself, and in particular about
the empirical relevance of logic for an adequate semantic analysis. Let us
consider a few examples not directly related to negation. It has been said
above (section 1.4.2.) that truth-conditional differences may be involved in
the ordering of conjuncts. This is so when the conjuncts express successive
events (they have aorist aspect). In those cases there is a clear difference be-
tween p and q on the one hand, and q and p on the other:
(54) a. He made a fortune and went to Spain,
b. He went to Spain and made a fortune.
It is not too difficult to see that, in principle, a discourse incrementation sys-
tem will be able to take care of this. Discourse semantics will have to provide
procedures for the proper incrementation of time-bound sentences, i.e. for
the expression of tense and aspect. It will be part of such procedures to pro-
vide some indexing method for predications under addresses with regard to
their ordering in time. The relative indexings of the conjuncts will then ex-
press this difference, and the truth-conditions for the conjunction as a
whole will differ accordingly.
There is thus no doubt that the difference between (aorist) p and q and
q and p is fully truth-conditional. One may still wonder whether, in that
case, natural language and in conjunctions under aorist tense is not truth-
functional. But this conclusion is not warranted since the time indexings of
each conjunct are part of their truth-conditions, so that, with the proper in-
dexings, p A q is equivalent to q A p, where p and q are truth-conditionally
correct logical analyses, and A is the logical conjunction operator. Even so,
however, the fact remains that p and q, where p and q are sentences, is not
equivalent to q and p. If the order of the sentences is inverted, different
propositions come about, as a result of the now different time indexings.
In other words, once logical p A q has been expressed as p and q, logical
q Ap can no longer be expressed linguistically. This is a semantic property
of natural language conjunctions, which is not reflected in standard
propositional calculus, with truth-functional and symmetrical and. It is
perhaps possible to develop a propositional calculus that behaves in a way
that is strictly parallel to what is found in language, but that logic would
have no other purpose than to reflect what happens in language. Useful
though such an exercise is for a better understanding of language, no intrin-
sic logical purpose is served by it. It would be an exercise in applied logic,
not in pure logic.
A similar pattern emerges when the other traditional truth-functional
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operators of standard propositional calculus are considered. The increment
value of and, as we have seen, consists in the incrementation of its conjuncts
in the order in which they occur in the sentence (whereby each conjunct is
a separate unit of incrementation). The disjunction operator or has the ef-
fect of splitting up D into as many subdomains as there are disjuncts, this
splitting being marked as a commitment, on the part of the speaker, that
at least one of the disjuncts/subdomains is to be added as part of D. Impli-
cations of the form ifp then q have the incremental effect of stipulating (as
a domain instruction) that i(p) is not to be excluded from D but that it is
allowable only if conjoined with i(<7).
Interestingly, natural language grammars provide no way to express the
normal, non-contrastive, non-radical negation of conjunctions, disjunc-
tions and implications other than by the prefixing of "it is not the case that"
or some similarly artificial periphrastic, involving separate incrementation
procedures under predicates like "be the case that". Apparently, not is de-
fined only for increments, whether new or already processed and now repro-
cessed. And apparently, it is not only conjuncts that form separate in-
crementation units but also disjuncts and the clauses of implications. These
are aspects, however, that we cannot investigate more fully here.
What, then, is the empirical value of logical systems that aim at incor-
porating, as much as possible, the quirks of natural linguistic interpretation
processes? In at least one respect this value is clear. Any logical system re-
quires the setting up of well-defined logical analyses that function as units
in the logic machinery. To the extent that a logic mirrors natural language
processes more faithfully, one is more justified in claiming that the logical
analyses figuring in it embody structural and semantic constraints on the
semantic analyses to be provided by the grammar for the sentences of the
language. In this way, the logical system shows up the logical conditions that
must be fulfilled by any semantic theory, besides the other conditions that
must be met. But there can be no question of the logical system itself being
part of the semantic machinery of cognitive processing of uttered sentences.
All one can demand is that the structural and logical properties of the ana-
lyses that occur in the logic be somehow incorporated into the semantic ana-
lyses and definitions of sentences and words occurring in them, so that the
semantic theory is kept logically sound.
This shows again that, in language, logic is epiphenomenal on the struc-
tures and processes that occur in the semantic and cognitive processing of
uttered sentences. Existing logical analyses only do partial justice to the real-
ity of language, and in some cases, such as disjunction and implication, they
actually distort it. Obviously, attempts at developing sound logics that do
fuller justice to language are to be welcomed and appreciated if only because
they attempt to show the logical soundness of language. Yet, no matter how
well they fit the facts of language, any claim to the effect that the logical
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properties of the expressions figuring in them (such as monotonicity, to take
just an example) are relevant to the empirical study of meaning phenomena
will have to be argued for separately and independently. This, then is the
status claimed for the three-valued logic with its two negations described
above: it appears to provide a logical account of the presuppositional differ-
ences of minimal and radical negation. If the logical analysis is correct and
the observations on which it is based reflect linguistic reality, semantic ana-
lyses of sentences are constrained by this logic, and minimal and radical ne-
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NOTES
1. For further details, see Seuren (1985: 217).
2. Cp. Gazdar 1979: 65-6: "But no language, to the best of my knowledge, has two or more
different types of negation such that the appropriate translation of (11) [ = John doesn 't regret
having failed] could be automatically 'disambiguated' by the choice of one rather than the
other."
3. Natural language happily mixes object and metalanguage. The Liar paradox and its kin
are obviated by other means than the strict separation of object and metalanguage (cp. Seuren
to appear).
4. This way of incrementing radically negated sentences differs from what is proposed in Seu-
ren (1985: 331), where the double asterisk is used to mark radical negation. The proposal made
here is more explanatory and based on a more careful analysis, prompted to a large extent by
the works of Horn and Van der Sandt.
5. One may well wonder what happens in languages, such as Turkish, with morphologically
incorporated negation. According to A in section 1.3, morphologically incorporated negations
are necessarily presupposition-preserving. One would, therefore, expect such languages to
have a separate negation word to be used when radical negation is called for. Turkish has, be-
sides the bound morpheme mV (i.e. with a vowel that follows vowel harmony), also the word
de£il. It remains to be seen whether de£il is required for radical negation, besides its other func-
tions in the language.
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